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ABSTRACT
A concurrent-embedded mixed-method triangulation design evaluated observed safety
outcomes at a U.S. 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 121 air carrier. A
previously validated model that measures Safety Management Systems (SMS process
engagement and SMS policy implementation), transformational safety leadership, selfefficacy, safety motivation (mediator), and safety behaviors (safety compliance and
safety participation) was assessed using structural equation modeling/path analysis.
Semi-structured interviews of SMS subject-matter experts and safety leaders were used to
explore the impact of SMS implementation. Factual data from the carrier was examined
to provide convergent or divergent information regarding the other portions of the study.
The results indicated SMS policy implementation had a significant effect on safety
compliance (SC) and safety participation (SP), but SMS process engagement impacted
only safety compliance (SC). A moderate relationship was found between safety
motivation and both SC and SP. The results also indicated a significant effect of
transformational safety leadership on safety motivation and SP. Self-efficacy and SC
were weakly related. The results point to the importance of transformational leadership,
clear safety policy, and motivation on safety outcomes. Gender differences were noted in
SC and safety-related events, while years at the carrier were impactful on SC. Role at the
company impacted safety-related event scores. Practitioners might consider tailored
training due to the differences noted in this study. Future research is required to explore

xxi

the impact of experience, role, and gender on safety outcomes and safety-related events
estimation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Continuous improvement of air safety is a critical undertaking for the airline
industry. Passenger fatalities resulting from commercial aircraft accidents in the United
States have remained at zero per 100,000 departures for the past decade (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2021). However, two separate accidents involving Boeing’s
737 MAX aircraft have dramatically impacted the world’s aviation community resulting
in a call for a reassessment of the system safety approach used by regulatory agencies and
commercial air carriers.
As a result of the system safety failures identified in the investigation of these two
crashes, Safety Management System has been recommended not only for implementation
at air carriers but original equipment manufacturers, as well (FAA, 2020). Data-driven
assessment of the functioning of an organization’s SMS is integral to maintaining the
highest level of safety for the flying public and meeting 14 CFR Part 5 Safety
Management Systems requirements (USGPO, 2016).
The FAA Safety Management System, FAA Order 8000.369, is the formal, topdown, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness
of safety risk controls. SMS has been implemented in the commercial aviation arena to
integrate safety policies and augment safety performance at organizational and individual
levels (Chen & Chen, 2014). SMS is widely recognized as providing a systematic
approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures,
1

accountabilities, policies, and procedures (ICAO, 2013). The study of the implementation
of a framework like SMS presents opportunities for both company management and the
FAA to gain new insights into the carrier (FAA, 2018; USGPO, 2016).
Figure 1
A proposed model of the integrated systems of the SMS (FAA, 2019).

Under an SMS, regulated entities identify undue risks in their operations and
develop systematic procedures, practices, and policies to control such risks. The FAA
requires that a carrier’s SMS be appropriate to the size, scope, and complexity of the
certificate holder’s operation and include at least the following components: safety policy;
safety risk management; safety assurance; and safety promotion (USGPO, 2016). Figure
1 outlines the key elements of an SMS and captures the extensive effort required of a
company to implement and maintain the system. SMS represents a proactive means
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to identify and control potential safety risks, rather than a reactive approach focusing on
discovering and mitigating the cause of an accident or safety issue after its occurrence
(FAA, 2015). A carrier must submit their SMS implementation plan to the State Safety
Oversight entity (i.e., the FAA in the case of U.S. Part 121 certificated carriers).
Statement of the Problem
Research into the effectiveness of an SMS post-implementation at commercial
carriers in the United States is limited. SMS has been mandated by most state aviation
regulatory entities worldwide. SMS can be costly and time-intensive to implement
(Adjekum, 2014b; Ulfvengren & Corrigan, 2015). The state of the safety program in an
organization at the time of implementation can significantly impact the success of the
adoption and execution of an SMS (Ioannou et al., 2017; Robertson, 2016).
Ironically, though not mandated by the FAA in the collegiate setting, a relatively
comprehensive body of research addresses SMS implementation in university aviation
programs (see Robertson, 2018; Gao & Rajendran, 2017; Adjekum, 2014a). Studies in
China, Europe, and Canada have provided some insight into the introduction and
maintenance of an SMS in the commercial arena (Insley & Turkoglu, 2020; McDonald et
al., 2000; Gerede, 2015; David-Cooper, 2015).
The studies mentioned above focused on the broader aspect of SMS initiatives
among the stated population without considering the somewhat nuanced relationships
between SMS initiatives and variables such as transformational safety leadership, selfefficacy, and safety performance parameters, such as safety motivation and self-reported
safety behaviors. Adjekum (2017) recommended a further inquiry into the relationships
between safety management systems (SMS) initiatives, transformational safety
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leadership, self-efficacy, and the safety performance parameters mentioned earlier at 14
CFR Part 121 carriers with an SMS. This examination of SMS at a Part 121 carrier
aimed to fill a gap in research in the broader U.S aviation industry.
There are other gaps in the research, as well. Previous studies are generally
deficient in analyzing the post-implementation efficacy of an organization’s SMS.
Additionally, most current studies do not occur at a North American commercial carrier,
thus possibly limiting their applicability in the U.S. Finally, previous studies focused on
the antecedents to an effective SMS by relating post-implementation data to existing
safety culture or safety program data.
Though each study contributes to the body of literature and research, much of the
work mentioned earlier does not address the issue of assessing the health of an SMS by
concurrently gathering survey data, ethnographic interview data, and objective safety
artifacts and measures. The lack of such a triangulation approach to determine if line
employee attitudes and opinions, management attitudes and opinions, and actual safety
data indicate convergence or divergence regarding SMS effectiveness at the carrier
weakens the overall body of research.
SMS requires continuous improvement and is not a static process. Given the
investment by the enterprise and the requirements of 14 CFR Part 5 to collect assurance
data on the SMS performance of the company, a data-driven approach to evaluating the
relationship between the study variables and safety outcomes can be a critical part of this
understanding. This study can be of use to company leadership (including the
Accountable Executive) to provide insight into areas of success and areas of opportunity
within an SMS.
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At all levels within the organization, this study can provide detailed information
by demographic group where opportunities for SMS functional improvement might exist.
Additionally, using similar measures like those studied by Adjekum & Tous (2020) and
Schwarz et al. (2016), this work can help highlight where an SMS is working
exceptionally well, promoting opportunities for incorporation across the broader
enterprise in a Safety-II or resilience mindset. Finally, a reliable objective measure can
serve as a tool for company management and the state regulatory agency to assess the
health and efficacy of a carrier’s SMS.
Purpose of the Study
This research uses a concurrent mixed methods data triangulation approach to
evaluate the relationships between SMS initiative, transformational safety leadership,
self-efficacy, and safety performance parameters such as safety motivation and selfreported safety behaviors in a U.S Part 121 carrier. Safety motivation was used in a
mediation analysis, participant perceptions of study variables were examined, and
statistically significant differences were reported.
This research was designed to provide a quantitative measurement model for an
objective evaluation of SMS effectiveness and the inter-relationships with other study
variables at a Part 121 carrier. Additionally, the qualitative portion of the research was
designed to unearth themes to provide a contextual understanding of the data gathered
using the quantitative models.
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach
A concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach was utilized to gather
quantitative and qualitative data using various techniques during a fixed time window.
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The examination of the data, corporate artifacts, and objective safety outcomes allow the
researcher to make holistic inferences regarding the efficacy of SMS implementation
(Wahyuni, 2012).
Respondent data was examined for convergence or divergence regarding the study
variables and the objective safety artifacts to provide a holistic view of the functioning of
the carrier’s SMS. Safety artifacts, including aggregate assurance data that objectively
captures the airline's safety performance, were assessed. The same approach could be
utilized at regular intervals to allow a longitudinal study.
The concurrent triangulation strategy has been effectively used before in the
literature to holistically analyze similar variables in a collegiate environment (Adjekum
& Jensen, 2016). Concurrent means the quantitative data, qualitative data, and evidence
from company artifacts (documentary data) will be gathered over a fixed period in the
organization’s history, thus providing a single snapshot for analysis. The results from
both research approaches are compared to determine if convergence, divergence, or some
combinations exist regarding the survey data from line employees, interview data from
management, and objective company safety data.
Where convergence exists, the company may infer some confidence in the
effectiveness of their SMS program and possibly consider reinforcing these positive
measures using a Safety-II mindset. Where divergence exists, potential gaps in a
company’s SMS may be indicated, highlighting focus areas for deeper analysis for the
leadership and safety teams.
The concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach generally uses different
quantitative and qualitative methods to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with
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the strength of the other (Creswell, 2009). Additionally, to derive the maximum
effectiveness of the approach when gathering data concurrently, equal weight should be
assigned across methods--even if skewness is detected in the data set (Plano, Clark &
Creswell, 2008).
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between this study's qualitative and quantitative
aspects. By utilizing both the qualitative and quantitative approaches in tandem, the
researcher obtains a richer and more detailed view of the nuance of the construct being
studied (Saldana & Omasta, 2018).
Figure 2
The relationship between the multiple modalities utilized in this mixed methods approach.

Potential Measures
Researchers such as Adjekum and Tous (2020), Adjekum (2017), Meng-Yuan
Liao (2015), Chen and Chen (2014), von Thaden (2008), and Gill and Shergill (2004)
have proposed a variety of measures that can be used to assess the relationship between
7

safety culture and SMS in aviation entities such as collegiate aviation and commercial
airlines. The following variables were identified and re-validated for this work in line
with Adjekum’s 2017 work (with supporting documentation for each):
a) SMS - perceptions of the SMS initiative (SMS process engagement and SMS
policy implementation) were measured by items developed by Adjekum
(2017), with roots in previous research by Adjekum and Jensen (2016), Chen
and Chen (2014), and relayed in the Transport Canada SMS assessment guide
(2005). Adjekum (2017) reports two distinct alpha coefficients for his
instrument (since the SMS construct was divided into separate items): SMS
process engagement, .75 and SMS policy implementation, .93.
b) Safety motivation - safety motivation measured the degree to which
respondents regard safety as an essential part of their professional
development, developed from the work of Neal and Griffin (2006). The
reported Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is .90.
c) Self-efficacy – self-efficacy was measured by the Generalized Self-Efficacy
Scale developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) to assess pilot perception
regarding their ability to deal with non-normal situations. Previous studies
reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for this instrument.
d) Transformational safety leadership – adopted from the Survey of
Transformational Leadership (STL) developed by Edwards, Knight, Broome,
and Flynn (2010). Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) at the group
level of the carrier measured the quality of leadership provided by supervisory
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flight managers such as Chief / Assistant Chief Pilots. Previous work by
Adjekum (2017) indicates Cronbach alpha coefficients over .84.
e) Safety behavior (safety compliance and safety participation) - safety behavior
consisting of two components, i.e., safety compliance and safety participation,
is adopted from Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) and Neal and Griffin (2006).
Safety compliance evaluates the core tasks that pilots must accomplish to
maintain flight safety. Safety participation assesses how pilots help develop an
environment that supports safety outcomes. The reported alpha coefficients
for safety compliance and safety participation are .91 and .84, respectively.
f) Safety-related events – adopted from Adjekum’s (2014a) Collegiate Aviation
Perception of Safety Culture Assessment Scale or CAPSCAS instrument.
These items evaluated the relationship between respondents’ knowledge
regarding company safety-related events and their safety behavior. The
reported reliability of this instrument is .92.
Research Questions
This research utilizes an anonymous survey instrument administered to mid-level
managers (base chief pilots and headquarters pilots) and front-line employees (line pilots)
who work at the selected carrier. The survey was designed to answer the following
questions:
1. What is the effectiveness of a final measurement model that assesses the
relationships between SMS process engagement, SMS policy implementation,
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the outcome variable
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safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety participation, when
mediated by safety motivation at a commercial air carrier?
2. What are the strengths of the relationship between safety behavior (as measured
by safety compliance and safety participation) and safety-related events?
3. What are the differences in perception among the demographic variables (years
at the carrier, age group, SMS training status, and flight certification level (first
officer, captain, check airman)) on safety behavior?
Semi-Structured Interview Questions
Additionally, the following questions were posed to selected senior management
personnel using a semi-structured interview to explore the leadership perspective on the
health of the carrier’s SMS (Adjekum, 2017):
1. What role does leadership play in the safety policy implementation of the SMS
program?
2. What are some of the benefits of SMS implementation at the carrier?
3. What are some of the challenges in executing SMS at the carrier?
4. What recommendations do you have for other carriers that are in the process of
implementing SMS?
5. What are some of the measures used to determine how well your SMS is
functioning?
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Statement of Hypotheses
SMS Process Engagement, Safety Motivation, and Safety Behavior
A final measurement model on the relationship between SMS initiatives and other
safety variables proposed and validated by Adjekum (2017) was envisaged to be the
framework for this current study. Adjekum (2017) further suggests a strong relationship
between a positive perception of an SMS initiative (process engagement and policy
implementation) and proactive safety behaviors among aviation service providers.
Other researchers have corroborated similar findings, such as Neal, Griffin, and
Hart (2000), Neal and Griffin (2006), and Freiwald (2013). Safety motivation as a
mediator between concepts like policy implementation, process engagement, and safety
behaviors has been validated in research by Vatankhah (2021), Xia et al. (2020), and
Chen and Chen (2014).
Based on the previous findings from the Adjekum (2017) study, it was
hypothesized that at U.S. carriers there exists a relationship between personnel perception
of SMS initiatives (policy implementation and process engagement) and their motivation
to act safely (safety compliance and safety behavior):
H1: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement are
related to their safety motivation.
H2: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement are
related to safety compliance.
H3: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement are
related to safety participation.

11

H4 Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their carrier’s SMS process engagement and safety compliance.
H5: Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their carrier’s SMS process engagement and safety participation.
Figure 3
The fully mediated (baseline) Path Model shows the relationship between SMS process
engagement, SMS policy implementation, self-efficacy, transformational safety
leadership, safety motivation, and the outcome variable safety behavior, comprised of
safety compliance and safety participation.

SMS Policy Implementation, Safety Motivation, and Safety Behavior
Adjekum’s 2017 model states that SMS policy implementation quantifies the
degree to which an organization has a concise and executable SMS policy with clear roles
and responsibilities for all participants. Additionally, a clear chain of command,
authority, and lines of communication are crucial (ICAO, 2009; Stolzer et al., 2016; Chen
& Chen, 2014). Based on the body of work to date, the hypothesized direct and indirect
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effects of perception of SMS policy implementation on the study variables were
hypothesized as follows:
H6: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation are
related to their safety motivation.
H7: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation are
related to safety compliance.
H8: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation are
related to safety participation.
H9: Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and safety compliance.
H10: Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and safety participation.
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Motivation, and Safety Behavior
Existing literature suggests that a higher level of transformational leadership
should motivate subordinates to put more effort into their work and go above and beyond
the call of duty for their leaders (Barling & Kelloway, 2002; Lowe, et al., 1996; Mirza &
Isha, 2017; Inness et al., 2010; and Smith et al., 2016). It was hypothesized supervisory
management’s transformational safety leadership would motivate respondents to exhibit
acceptable safety behaviors during operational tasks. The relationships between
transformational safety leadership, safety motivation, and safety behaviors are outlined
below:
H11: The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level management are
related to the safety motivation of respondents.
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H12: Top-level management's transformational safety leadership styles are related
to respondent safety compliance.
H13: Top-level management's transformational safety leadership styles are related
to respondent safety participation.
H14: Safety motivation of respondents mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of transformational safety leadership and safety compliance.
H15: Safety motivation of respondents mediates the relationship between their
perceptions of transformational safety leadership and safety participation.
Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior, and Safety-Related Events
Self-efficacy refers to pilot perception regarding their ability to complete assigned
tasks and deal with non-normal situations (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Existing
literature suggests that pilot self-efficacy is a reliable predictor of pilot performance (Ji et
al., 2017; Prinzel, 2002; Parasuraman, Molly & Singh, 1993). Additionally, current
research suggests that high levels of self-efficacy are directly related to positive
performance outcomes in various disciplines, such as academics (Kader, 2022), nursing
(Cayir & Ulupinar, 2021), the maritime industry (Kim et al., 2021), and tourism and
hospitality (Kautish, et al., 2021). Specifically, in aviation, Ji et al. (2017) found safety
motivation and self-efficacy mediate the relationship between flight cadet perfectionism
and situational judgment. Additionally, Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) found that selfefficacy is relevant to pilot perception regarding goal achievement and effort to improve
work-related and management performance. Finally, researchers Schunk & Pajares
(2001) and Graham and Weiner (1995) found that self-efficacy can be a reliable predictor
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of behavior and behavioral change. The hypotheses outlined below explore the
relationships and the mediating effect of safety motivation on the equation:
H16: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety motivation.
H17: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to safety compliance.
H18: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to safety participation.
H19: Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their self-efficacy
and safety compliance perceptions.
H20: Respondent motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions
of their self-efficacy and safety participation.
H21: Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation.
H22: Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation when
mediated by an awareness of safety-related events.
H23: Respondent safety compliance is related to their perception of safety-related
events.
The Rationale for Proposed Methods
Historical Perspective on Proposed Research Methods
There is value to both quantitative and qualitative approaches when studying
institutional behavior and group dynamics. Combining the data gathered in the
quantitative phase of the effort, coupled with the greater depth and breadth of information
captured in the qualitative phase, offers a more holistic analysis than either technique
could provide. Thus, a mixed or multi-method design was deemed appropriate for
developing a deep and rich understanding of the constructs under examination (Wahyuni,
2012). The mixed-method design allows a researcher to determine paradigmatic
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corroboration or consensus between the numbers and the words (Saldana & Omasta,
2018). Additionally, notable studies on SMS effectiveness in aviation have utilized
mixed-method designs previously (Adjekum, 2017; Adjekum & Jensen, 2016; Adjekum,
2014a; von Thaden et al., 2006).
Wahyuni (2012) recommends after identification of the central research
question(s), the next step will be to determine the best fit of method and methodology to
ensure an effective empirical inquiry. The choice of method for any research is driven by
overarching considerations regarding the ontology and epistemology of the research
paradigm.
In the case of researching the effectiveness of a performance-based, regulatory
framework like SMS, it will be expedient to use both objective and subjective measures
to conduct the inquiry (Rispler, 2021; Stolzer et al., 2018; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).
Additionally, a mix of conceptual research paradigms such as Positivism, Pragmatism,
and Constructivism can be helpful when choosing the empirical approach in a research
effort (Saldana & Omasta, 2017; Creswell, 2009).
Positivism can be characterized by external criteria independent of the actors.
These criteria can be measured and developed into a comprehensive model of the
behavior or phenomena--akin to what many laypeople think of as the “scientific method”
(Wahyuni, 2012).
This research effort will be limited in scope if the nature of the social construct
regarding the relationship between senior airline management, middle management, and
line pilots vis-à-vis the implementation of SMS is not considered. Since there is an
element of perception regarding the effectiveness of the carrier’s SMS amongst multiple
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groups, tools like the line employee survey and the management semi-structured
interview are appropriate to capture the data.
Thus, Pragmatism is also a necessary framework to capture the variations in
attitudes and perceptions that one can expect to uncover as part of this research effort.
Pragmatism refers to a level of subjective analysis using sufficient knowledge to
synthesize different perspectives to help interpret the data.
Additionally, the constructivist paradigm must also be utilized when
considering the qualitative aspects of the study. Also known as social conservatism,
constructivism generally refers to a scenario in which participants develop subjective
meanings for their experience (Creswell, 2009).
When using such an immersive approach as the constructivist paradigm, one
should use caution that a researcher’s background can shape results, so consideration of
bias is crucial. Typically, open-ended instruments are utilized, and it is generally worthy
to look for response variability across factors such as gender, nationality, etc. When
researching SMS, safety culture may be a constructivist paradigm worthy of
consideration.
Review of Techniques
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to establish paths and determine
the strength of relationships amongst the variables. Jausan, et al. (2017) employed
structural equation modeling to obtain a holistic view of the cumulative effect of different
barriers on safety reporting with an organization’s SMS. Mokarami et al. (2019) utilized
SEM to examine the relationships between accidents, safety culture, and unsafe behavior
of bus drivers. Teske and Adjekum (2021, 2022) used SEM to explore the relationship
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between components of SMS and various behaviors in the space operations field. Other
researchers (Hair et al., 2021; Reinartz et al., 2009; and Henseler & Sarstedt, 2013) have
also utilized SEM in organizational settings. The value of SEM was its applicability to
both observed and latent variables.
SEM was warranted since an a priori set of relationships was available (based
upon prior research). “The ability to analyze both observed and latent variables
distinguishes SEM from more standard statistical techniques, such as the analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and multiple regression, which analyze observed variables only”
(Kline, 2016, p. 13). SEM can provide information on the magnitude of interactions of
variables, and SEM has been used effectively in the analysis of mediating variables
(Sardeshmukh & Vandenberg, 2017). The relationship between safety indicators and
safety outcomes (safety behavior and self–reported safety events) was also examined.
Simultaneously, the perspectives of a selected group of senior management
personnel (leaders at headquarters, leaders at the line pilot or base level, and line pilots)
regarding the state of the SMS were assessed through a semi-structured interview. A final
triangulation process was used to integrate the quantitative data, qualitative data, and
document analysis, including a review of documented aggregate data of safety
performance indicators derived from carrier safety assurance data.
The creation of a tool to evaluate the efficacy of a carrier’s SMS through
examining the study variables will allow both the aviation service regulator and the air
carrier to have insight into the health of the carrier’s program (in a single department or
across multiple work units). The results can help pinpoint areas within the carrier’s SMS
that might require immediate attention. The tool will allow carriers to prioritize limited
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resources based on needs within their SMS. Previous studies have examined the
relationship between SMS implementation and employees' attitudes towards safety in
airport operations (Remawi et al., 2011). It is essential to replicate and expand such
studies at Part 121 carriers.
Research Assumptions & Limitations
Researchers have identified a potential pitfall when utilizing triangulation and a
mixed-method approach (Creswell, 2009). The challenge of conducting an inquiry with
different methods is the final integration of the data. Care must be taken to ensure
statistical rigor throughout the analysis and data reduction. Resolving discrepancies that
emerged during the comparative analysis of the findings can also be a challenge. A
thorough review of both the qualitative and quantitative data is required to rectify any
disparities in the data.
The concept of transformational safety leadership is highly subjective.
Traditionally, it can be challenging to control for the contact between pilots and levels of
management relative to the respondents, as pilots may encounter a wide variety of
operational safety leadership in various settings. A study should consider controlling for
potentially confounding influences such as prior flight experience, experience under an
SMS, nationality, gender, or other variables that might impact a pilot’s perception of their
carrier’s SMS (Adjekum, 2014a; Kearns & Aitken-Schermer, 2017).
Additionally, the literature indicates that cross-sectional studies may be
constrained in determining cause and effect relationships (Creswell, 2009). The method is
also limited to a snapshot of perceptions of SMS implementation within the study period
and may not indicate the general trend over a long period. Consideration must be given to
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the possibility that the dynamic nature of flight operations and the real-time occurrence of
safety-related events during the study period may unfavorably skew respondents’
perceptions.
Scope of Research and Exclusion Criteria
This research did not attempt to address all possible safety behaviors at a
commercial air carrier. Although not every permutation of events could be examined, the
conditions represented in this study were hypothesized to represent the environment at
the airline at the time of study administration (six weeks in 2021).
The study did not include all workgroups at the airline (such a project would be
well-suited for follow-on research). Additionally, this research is limited to line pilots,
management pilots, and safety-related and SMS-related staff. Thus, the results should not
be generalized across a wider population.
Finally, the use of factual safety data for comparison to respondent perception
regarding reporting of safety-related events helps understand the efficacy of a carrier’s
SMS. However, there is also value in examining the relationship between the selfreporting of safety events and respondent perception of SMS, self-efficacy,
transformational safety leadership, safety motivation, and safety behavior.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The following reviews the components of a Safety Management System (SMS),
tools to measure the effectiveness of an SMS (as related generally to the antecedents of
safety culture and the resultant safety outcomes), and the theoretical basis of the
components of the SMS measurement model proposed in this work. The nominal
application of the prescriptive nature of SMS in commercial aviation and the current shift
to a performance-based approach in its application are also discussed.
Additionally, the theoretical underpinnings and the work to date regarding the
relationship between transformational safety leadership on safety behavior, self-efficacy,
safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety participation are addressed. Alternatives
to theories and measures are also presented, along with research regarding SMS in other
industries. The mediating role of safety motivation on safety behavior is of particular
importance in utilizing a model for evaluating the effects of the perception of SMS
constructs on safety behavior and events. The literature review also explores gaps in
research on the relationships between the constructs mentioned above within the aviation
industry and specifically in United States Part 121 (commercial) operations.
A central tenet regarding the efficacy of an SMS (and the quantitative instruments
used to assess the effectiveness of its implementation) concerns person-based error
management. Various theories are explored as they apply to the proposed model of this
research.
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Safety Management System Overview
The Federal Aviation Administration Air (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (the
operational arm of the FAA) describes SMS as the “formalized and proactive approach to
system safety which supports the mission of the FAA, which is ‘to provide the safest,
most efficient aerospace system in the world.’” (FAA, 2019). Continuous improvement in
air safety has always been a critical undertaking for the airline industry. In recent years,
regulators and airlines have relied on implementing a Safety Management System (SMS)
to integrate safety policies and augment safety performance at both organizational and
individual levels (Chen & Chen, 2014). SMS is widely recognized as providing a
systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational
structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures (ICAO, 2013).
Figure 4
SMS policy and requirements hierarchy (FAA, 2019).
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Figure 4 depicts the SMS policy and requirements hierarchy. SMS, as
implemented in the United States, has its basis in governing principles based on guidance
from several sources, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the
FAA, the FAA Air Traffic Oversight Service (AOV), and the FAA Air Traffic
Organization (ATO). Together, these multiple sources are integrated into FAA Order JO
1000.37 Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System serves as the integration of
SMS at the ATO level.
An operator must invest both financial and human resources to ensure SMS
implementation is effective. SMS can be costly and time-intensive to implement
(Adjekum, 2014b; Ulfvengren & Corrigan, 2015). Additionally, SMS is an ongoing
process that seeks continuous improvement. Most aviation companies implement a
phased approach to be compliant with FAR and Advisory Circular guidelines, then begin
a journey with their regulator to evaluate the performance of their SMS in a dynamic
environment. A foundational question emerges: “What are the quantitative and
qualitative measures a carrier can use to evaluate to indicate the health of their SMS?”
The study of the implementation of a framework like SMS presents opportunities for both
company management and the FAA to gain new insights into the safety culture of a
carrier (FAA 2018 & 2019; USGPO 2016).
Safety Management System Initiatives, Implementation, and Practices
A Safety Management System can facilitate a productive relationship between
the aviation service regulator and the carrier to ensure the highest level of safety for the
flying public. By recognizing the organization's role in accident prevention, an SMS is
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designed to provide the following to both certificate holders and the Certificate
Management Office in the U.S. (FAA, 2019):
•

A structured means of safety risk management decision making

•

A means of demonstrating safety management capability before system failures
occur

•

Increased confidence in risk controls through structured safety assurance
processes

•

An effective interface for knowledge sharing between regulator and certificate
holder

•

A safety promotion framework to support a sound safety culture

The FAA Safety Management System directive (FAA Order 8000.369) defines SMS
as the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and
assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Under an SMS, regulated entities
identify undue risks in their operations and develop systematic procedures, practices, and
policies to control such risks (FAA, 2015).
SMS represents a proactive approach to identifying and controlling potential safety
risks, rather than a reactive approach focusing on discovering and mitigating the cause of
an accident or safety issue after its occurrence (FAA, 2015). A carrier must submit their
Safety Management System to the Administrator for acceptance.
The SMS must be appropriate to the size, scope, and complexity of the certificate
holder’s operation and include at least the following components: (1) safety policy; (2)
safety risk management; (3) safety assurance; and (4) safety promotion (FAA, 2019).
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This work will focus on developing an objective measure for the effectiveness of a
carrier’s SMS to be used as an assurance method on SMS itself.
Figure 5 depicts the design and performance aspects of a Safety Management
System. A carrier should plan to function at the lowest level of acceptable risk through
the performance of safety risk management (on the design side) and safety assurance (on
the performance side).
Figure 5
Integrated components of the SMS (FAA, 2015).

Safety Policy
One of the critical components of an organization’s SMS is a safety policy. Safety
policy contains those overarching precepts that connect leadership with line employees
and serve as the basis for the system safety embedded in the organization (FAA, 2019).
Safety policy might take the form of a Safety and Security Commitment, Safety
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Objectives, designation of key-related personnel (up to and including the Accountable
Executive), and other guidelines and principles available to all employees. Further details
in an organization’s safety policy might address the cadence and type of routine meetings
and reporting and the highlights of the structure supporting the carrier’s SMS.
Organizational artifacts addressing safety policy can provide insights into the
effectiveness of its SMS.
Safety Risk Management
Safety risk management (SRM) is designed to reduce organizational safety risk by
improving strategic issues management and daily operational decision-making. The
safety risk management process should address the following: system analysis, hazard
identification, safety risk analysis, safety risk assessment, safety risk controls, and
assurance plan implementation (FAA, 2019).
Safety risk management involves using trained subject matter experts to perform
the following: describe the system state, produce a hazard statement (if warranted),
address controls, identify any new hazards, and then develop an assurance plan. Residual
risk must be considered, as well.
The output of SRM should flow to a systematic process to ensure risk is accepted
by the appropriate company official at the requisite leadership level, up to and including
the Accountable Executive (FAA, 2015, 2019; ICAO, 2013, 2016). This collaborative
approach is crucial. SMS can be considered adequate when non-operational business
leaders reflexively utilize a risk-based lens to consider organizational change with the
same ease and familiarity as the lens of general accounting principles.
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At the operator level, safety risk management might entail the development of an
operational risk registry, a regular cadence of meetings between company teams, and
sessions with the regulator (FAA, 2015, 2019).
Safety Assurance
A vital aspect of an effective SMS implementation is gathering data on the
system's performance, known as safety assurance. In the realm of flight operations at a
United States commercial (Part 121) Carrier, 14 CFR Part 5.71 Safety Performance
Monitoring and Measurement, 14 CFR Part 5.73 Safety Performance Assessment, and 14
CFR Part 5.75 Continuous Improvement apply. Thus, operators must utilize data
acquisition and analysis to provide feedback on the safety risk management framework.
Data acquisition can take many forms in the realm of commercial aviation:
voluntary internal anonymous safety reports, voluntary external safety reports (Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Awareness Program (ASAP)).
Two critical programs at the carrier and workgroup level include de-identified data
gathered directly from the aircraft (Flight Operations Quality Assurance data or FOQA)
and observations by specially trained peers (Line Orientated Safety Observations or
LOSA).
AC 120-82 Flight Operational Quality Assurance addresses the specifics of a
FOQA program, and its importance in the data assurance realm by sharing de-identified
carrier aircraft performance data with the Regulatory Authority (FAA, 2004).
Researchers posit the quality and availability of this de-identified data is essential as part
of an SMS assurance program that carriers ought to invest in relatively inexpensive
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commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS) that would allow large legacy aircraft to have
the same quality of data as the most modern jets (Bromfeld et al., 2020).
LOSA is a program engaged between a carrier, the LOSA Collaborative, and the
regulator designed (at its highest level) to provide near real-time observation from the
flight deck on a nearly continuous basis (FAA, 2014). The latest version, “continuous
LOSA,” is considered the gold standard of the LOSA program. However, many carriers
also participate in “traditional LOSA,” a comprehensive effort every two to three years
(LOSA, 2022). The airline in this study participated in continuous LOSA.
Both FOQA and LOSA existed before the implementation of SMS in the United
States. Both serve as excellent examples of the use of existing structures/processes during
the implementation of an SMS.
In commercial aviation, de-identified aircraft data can be compared to anonymous
industry data like the FAA’s Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
program. The exchange of information between departments and the concurrent analysis
is crucial for an effective SMS (USGPO, 2016). In safety assurance, an operator must
also audit their programs (including internal and external audits) and have specific
procedures for investigating accidents and incidents. Safety continuous improvement is
also a key result of safety assurance (FAA, 2019; ICAO, 2016; LOSA, 2022).
Safety Promotion
Safety promotion encompasses multiple aspects of an SMS: training for all
employees on their role within the system, role-specific training for those responsible for
the administration of the SMS, and broad-based communication within and across
departments to ensure safety is top of mind for all employees (FAA, 2015, 2019; ICAO
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2016). A carrier must be ready to adapt its safety promotion methods and modes to
engage employees across the spectrum of communication channels they utilize.
Punitive versus Performance-Based Approach
Until recently, government agencies in the U.S. have pursued a relatively punitive
approach with carriers regarding regulatory compliance. The regulator focuses on
identifying non-compliance and pushing against the carrier to effect change. The punitive
or compliance-based approach resulted in a very reactive structure that did little to
promote proactive behavior by commercial airlines to prevent accidents or incidents.
After decades of a punitive approach, a Compliance Philosophy approach was introduced
along with Safety Management System implementation (FAA, 2021, 2018). In 2021, the
FAA released FAA Order 8000.373B FAA Compliance Program which states:
To promote the highest level of safety and compliance with regulatory standards,
the FAA is implementing Safety Management System constructs based on
comprehensive safety data sharing between the FAA and the aviation community.
To foster this open and transparent exchange of data, the FAA believes that its
Compliance Program, supported by an established safety culture, is instrumental
in ensuring both compliance with regulations and the identification of hazards and
management of risk (p. 1).
Compliance philosophy evolved within the last decade as a recognition that a
purely “enforcement” based philosophy did little to facilitate collaboration between
carriers and the regulator. At the heart of compliance philosophy is the tenet that
deviations from compliance occur in highly dynamic operations. Thus, the regulator and
carrier should work together to constantly correct back to compliance (FAA, 2021, 2019).
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Tenets of “willing and able” to make corrections come into play (FAA, 2021).
Though enforcement is no longer the sole emphasis, it has been a challenge for the FAA
to accomplish the paradigm shift of perceived non-compliance as analogous to a
deviation that must be pursued (rather than utilizing root cause analysis to build processes
and procedures that would prevent an escape in the future, per FAA Order 8000.373B
FAA Compliance Program). Compliance philosophy is necessary for successfully
implementing and maintaining an SMS (FAA, 2015, 2019; ICAO, 2013, 2016). The
paradigm shift with the FAA might be a challenge until SMS matures: “As the FAA
adopts performance-based oversight and eschews prescriptive rule-based oversight, it
should be able to achieve the increase in safety it seeks, as it assimilates more and more
data and addresses current and future risks, not just past events. This will not occur,
however, without a significant cultural change within the agency, without a
transformation of its relationships with regulated entities, and without some shifting of
liability from the agency to the regulated entities for claims that arise from alleged
defects in the regulatory process or the implementation thereof” (Grizzle et al., 2016,
Section 5).
SMS can be called a performance-based system since the regulator’s role has
changed to ensure that carriers have a functioning SMS (with all the components outlined
earlier) and that carriers utilize their SMS to ensure compliance and proactive risk
management (FAA, 2021, 2019). All Part 121 carriers are now obligated to have an
FAA-approved SMS (FAA, 2021, 2015). Part 121 carriers continue to modify their SMS
to meet the needs of their operations while comparing notes with each other and the FAA.
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Commercial Air carriers also utilize industry groups (like Airlines for America) to
advocate for consistency from the FAA regarding regulatory interpretations under SMS,
and to manage expectations on what is covered (and not covered) under an SMS. The
FAA and industry are maturing together in their knowledge and experience operating
under an SMS. Organizations within the FAA (like AFS-900) are also very interested in
promoting SMS in other high-reliability organizations.
Application in Other Industries
SMS lends itself to many high-reliability organizations (HROs) and other processoriented endeavors. SMS has found application in a variety of settings, including
construction (Yiu et al., 2018), petrochemical (Wold & Laumann, 2015), medical
(Bevilacqua, 2009), nuclear (Bernard, 2021), mining (Thirumalai et al., 2021; Haas &
Yorio, 2016), maritime (Nordmo et al., 2022; Akyuz & Celik, 2014; Valdez-Banda &
Goerlandt, 2018), and emergency medical/fire services where safety outcomes are
essential (Lefsrud, et al., 2020). Additionally, SMS has found application in industries
where a reduction of injury, fatalities, and equipment damage is a priority (Nwankwo, et
al., 2020).
Review of Other Measurements of SMS Related Studies
Before the advent of SMS, many researchers attempted to demonstrate proposed
links between facets of safety culture, the components of SMS, and safety outcomes.
Additionally, others have tried to develop objective measures for all three constructs in
organizations--see Ahmad, T., Guilbaud, P., Louis, G., Anderson, K., Bouabid, A., &
Siriwardana, M. (2003) and Mendonca & Carney (2017).
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In 2008, Terry von Thaden and Alyssa Gibbons carried out a significant effort to
develop a unified measure of safety culture, called the Safety Culture Indicator Scale
Measurement System (SCISMS). With the sponsorship of the FAA, the researchers set
out to provide a tool that would allow operators to derive actionable information to
ensure regulatory compliance (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).
The work intended to integrate SCISMS as an additional tool in the framework of
aviation safety management and reporting, which includes the Advanced Qualification
Program (AQP), Aviation Safety Analysis Program (ASAP), Flight Operations Quality
Assurance Program (FOQA), and Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA). The final
SCISMS model measures organizational commitment, operations interaction, formal
safety indicators, informal safety indicators, and safety behaviors/outcomes (von Thaden
& Gibbons, 2008). Sub-factors for the primary constructs were developed for each
employee group at an airline. The 2008 study was built upon measures included in
previous work by von Thaden, Yongjuan, Jiang, and Dong (2006), which validated the
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) in the Chinese context.
In 2015, Ulfvengren & Corrigan took an innovative approach and applied Lean
theories to the development and implementation of SMS at an airline. Specifically, the
pair developed the System Change and Operations Evaluation (SCOPE) model. This
model was developed using Structured Enquiry (SE), designed to assess the change
required during the implementation of an SMS.
The authors proposed the SE would generate favorable recommendations for a
proposed enhanced SMS (Ulfvengren & Corrigan, 2015). Their work pointed out that
even if all of the necessary components for SMS implementation are in place, additional
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cycles of communication and sufficient time to strengthen social relations (like trust and
team-building) are required to ensure the change associated with the implementation of
an SMS will be successful (Ulfvengren & Corrigan, 2015).
In their 2018 study, Stolzer, Friend, Truong, Tuccio, and Aguiar evaluated the
potential use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an assessment tool for the
effectiveness of an SMS. DEA is a quantitative programming technique initially
developed for analyzing the performance of Decision-Making Units (DMUs) by looking
at the output efficiency scores of a system. The benefit of DEA is it requires very few
assumptions, allowing it to be applied in a wide variety of scenarios in which other
models cannot be used due to complexity or unknown factors (Stolzer et al., 2018).
The study combined a preliminary qualitative approach with a quantitative survey
instrument that measured: safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion. Though there were some concerns with the
discriminate validity of the final model (the square root of the average variance extracted
(AVE) for the construct variables was not more significant than the correlations amongst
the construct variables), the method proved helpful (Stolzer et al., 2018).
Robertson researched the relationship between elements of SMS and safety
culture. In his 2016 research, Robertson found strong relationships between the four
components of an SMS (safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion). In 2018, Robertson demonstrated strong relationships between safety
culture and SMS implementation, safety promotion, and management commitment to
SMS. Wang (2018, p. 104) posited that safety culture is one of the “deliverables of
SMS,” The elements of safety culture and SMS were examined. Finally, Velazquez and
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Bier (2015) determined that the limited exposure to SMS in an undergraduate setting
might hurt SMS implementation in other settings later in a pilot’s career.
Transformational Safety Leadership
This research refreshes work done by Adjekum’s 2017 study examining the
relationship between Safety Management System initiatives, transformational safety
leadership, self-efficacy, safety-related behavior, and safety-related events in a collegiate
aviation setting. This study addresses many of the same factors in a Part 121 setting. A
key aspect of his proposed model is the influence of transformational safety leadership on
safety outcomes. Thus, a fundamental understanding of transformational leadership is
required.
In their 2006 work, Bass & Riggio state leadership can occur at all levels and by
any individual—a fundamental tenet of a Safety Management System. There are
numerous examples within the safety and organizational realms where a disconnect
between leadership’s vision and line employees allows organizational drift (resulting in a
negative safety outcome). A leader’s vision is necessary (but not sufficient) to promote
and sustain a healthy safety culture (and hence a successful SMS). Without support from
line personnel, the central aspects of SMS (safety policy, promotion, safety risk
management, and assurance) cannot be effective. Faranhak et al. (2020) found team
member attitude toward change and transformational leadership are essential
determinants of implementation success. Hussain et al. (2021) reported a high degree of
transformational leadership could increase job satisfaction and organizational
commitment. Their meta-analysis found that in 13 of 19 valid cases, transformational
leadership and job satisfaction were positively related, and in 11 of 13 valid cases,
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transformational leadership and organizational commitment were positively correlated.
Thus, there is value in taking a closer look at transformational safety leadership and its
impact on safety outcomes.
Other researchers, such as Nordmo et al. (2022), Cavazotte et al. (2021), Smith et
al. (2020), and Jian and Probst (2016), all reported direct positive effects of
transformational leadership on individual and organizational safety outcomes.
Historical Background
Transformational leadership is the culmination of two earlier schools of thought
regarding leadership: charismatic leadership and transactional leadership. Weber (1947)
examined charismatic leadership. This school of thought posits the traits and
characteristics of the individual are the causal factors for leadership success. There are
multiple examples of charismatic leaders (from Gandhi to Christ to Hitler). An essential
distinction between charismatic leadership and transformational leadership regards the
notion of authentic versus inauthentic (or pseudo transformational) leadership (Bass &
Riggio, 2006).
Authentic transformational leadership is morally uplifting and can be further
characterized as socialized leadership. Socialized leadership is based on egalitarian
behavior, serves the collective interests, and develops and empowers others (Bass &
Riggio, 2006). On the contrary, personalized leadership is based on personal dominance
and authoritarian behavior and tends to be exploitive of others. Whereas charismatic
leadership can be socialized or personalized, transformational leadership can only be
socialized (Bass & Riggio, 2006).
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Burns (1980) branched out from the charismatic leadership model and further
characterized leadership as transactional or transformational. Transactional leadership
captures the most fundamental relationship between politicians when jobs for votes or
subsidies for campaign contributions are exchanged. Similarly, transactional leaders
offer incentives for desired behaviors and deny rewards for undesired behaviors (Burns,
1980). Though there is some validity to aspects of the transactional model, more
evidence has accumulated to demonstrate that transformational leadership can move
followers to exceed expected levels of performance and lead to high levels of follower
satisfaction and commitment to the group and the organization (Bass, 1998).
Transformational leaders seem to motivate others to do more than they initially
thought they would do and even more than they thought was possible. While studying
maritime cadets at sea, Normo et al. (2022) found significant positive main effects of
transformational leadership and sleep quality on naval job performance. Thus, when
tired, cadets working under a supervisor who exhibited transformational leadership
demonstrated better job performance than those whose leader did not exhibit
transformational leadership. Irshad et al. (2021) reported that transformational leadership
in a healthcare setting enhanced caregiver psychological well-being by mediating the
perceived impact of Covid-19 (thus providing better availability of caregivers for
patients).
Transformational leaders have higher expectations and typically achieve higher
performance (Hussain et al., 2021; Farahnak, 2020). Transformational leaders also tend
to have followers who are more committed and satisfied than others. Moreover,
transformational leaders empower followers to pay attention to their individual needs and
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personal development, helping followers to develop their leadership potential.
Transformational leadership involves inspiring others to commit to a shared vision, and
the development of the followers is as important as the attainment of the goal (Joubert &
Feldman, 2017; Bass & Riggio, 2006).
Components of Transformational Leadership
There are four core components of transformational leadership. Bass and Riggio
(2006) posit transformational leaders employ one or more of these core tenets to achieve
superior results.
Idealized influence. Transformational leaders serve as role models for their
followers. The leaders are admired, respected, and trusted. Followers identify with the
leaders and want to emulate them; leaders are endowed by their followers as having
extraordinary capabilities, persistence, and determination (Bass & Riggio, 2006). There
are two unique aspects of idealized influence: the leader’s behavior and the elements
attributed to the leader by followers and other associates (both attributes can purportedly
be independently measured using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ).
Inspirational motivation. Transformational leaders motivate and inspire others
by providing meaning and challenge to their work. Enthusiasm and optimism are
displayed, and leaders communicate and garner buy-in for a shared vision of the future
state. Idealized influence leadership and inspirational motivation form a combined single
factor of charismatic-inspirational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1993).
Intellectual stimulation. Transformational leaders stimulate their follower’s
desire to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and
using novel approaches to old problems (Bass & Riggio, 2006). There is no public
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criticism, every member must be heard, and followers are encouraged to try new
approaches. The MLQ can help quantify this aspect of transformational leadership.
Individualized consideration. Transformational leaders play the role of coach or
mentor appropriate to each follower (i.e., leaders use the Platinum Rule--do unto others
as they would be done unto) versus the Golden Rule. Followers and colleagues are
developed to achieve the highest levels of their potential. Individual differences in terms
of needs and desires are recognized. A two-way exchange in communication is utilized,
and “management by walking around” is practiced (Bass and Riggio, 2006). The MLQ is
designed to capture this aspect of transformational leadership.
The Full Range Leadership Model
The Full Range Leadership Model encapsulates the various aspects of
transformational leadership and some aspects of transactional leadership and laissez-faire
(or non-leadership) behavior. Figure 6 below depicts the relationship between the
different leadership approaches (the frequency axis denotes the least effective approach
toward the reader and the most effective approach away from the reader).
4 I’s. The 4 I’s refer to the core components of transformational leadership
(idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized
consideration) discussed earlier. Remember, a transformational leader uses one or more
of the 4 I’s to theoretically ensure the highest level of success (Bass & Riggio, 2006).
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Figure 6
The full range leadership model (Bass & Riggio, 2006).

Contingent reward (CR). Contingent Reward is a form of transactional
leadership that has limited efficacy in motivating others to achieve higher levels of
performance and development. The contingent reward is transactional (i.e., I will give
you X if you reach Y). Robinson and Boies (2016) found team members under a
contingent reward scheme generated more creative ideas on a project than those under an
intellectual stimulation condition. Additionally, if a leader exhibited contingent reward
or intellectual stimulation in their leadership style, the team member would work harder
and longer than those in a control group (Robinson & Boies, 2016). Buengeler et al.
(2016) found contingent reward behaviors might facilitate both leaders claiming and
follower giving regarding the leadership role. With age as a moderator, younger leaders
who utilized contingent reward effectively reduced voluntary turnover. In other research,
if the contingent reward was psychological (such as praise), the contingent reward can be
considered transformational (Antonakis et al., 2003).
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Management by exception (MBE). Management by Exception is considered a
corrective transaction, and Bass & Riggio posit that it is less effective than contingent
reward or the components of transformational leadership (2006). The corrective action
may be active (MBE-A) or passive (MBE-P). Though the MBE approach has only
limited uses, one case where it might be required and effective is in safety-sensitive
situations when errors need immediate correction (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Even in the
safety-sensitive situation, a mix of the 4 I’s of transformational leadership theory will
lead to more permanent results. Leaders sometimes might be forced to practice MBE-P
when monitoring many subordinates or a large operation.
Laissez-Faire leadership (LF). Lassiez-faire Leadership is avoidance or absence
of leadership and is the most passive approach (and it also tends to be the least effective).
Lassiez-faire (LF) represents a non-transaction (or inaction), authority unused, and
actions delayed. In this mode, the leader avoids getting involved.
Breevaart and Zacher (2019) evaluated the impact on perceived leadership
effectiveness after using a transformational leadership or laissez-faire leadership style. In
this study, perceived leadership effectiveness decreased when leaders exhibited less
transformational leadership (TL) and more LF. However, if leaders utilized greater than
one standard deviation beyond the mean amount of TL, followers gave higher ratings on
leadership effectiveness regardless of LF level (Breevart & Zacher, 2019).
The interaction between bullying, work pressure, and day-to-day leadership of
supervisors was studied by Agotnes et al. (2021). The researchers found that laissez-faire
leadership behavior (but not transformational leadership) moderated work pressure. and
bullying-related negative acts relationship. The findings support the assumption that
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laissez-faire leadership facilitates the development of conflict escalation and workplace
bullying, while transformational leadership does not (Agotnes et al., 2021).
Connecting Transformational Leadership and Objective Measures
There are some strong indicators that transformational safety leadership is a
valuable metric when considering the connection between the implementation of a Safety
Management System and objective safety measures. A few other studies expound upon
the work of Bass and Riggio and others who are proponents of the positive impact of
transformational leadership on safety climate and safety outcomes. Meta-analysis was
used to collapse multiple studies regarding the primary instrument used to assess the Full
Range Leadership Model (known as the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire or MLQ)
and subjective leadership style measures and objective measures of leadership
performance (Bass, 2006).
Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam (1996) found the average correlation
coefficients between characteristics like charisma (r = .71 from 32 studies), intellectual
stimulation (r = .58 from 31 studies), and individualized consideration (r = .59 from 29
studies) and subjective measures of leader performance are generally higher than the
correlations between the same characteristics and objective measures of performance
(charisma, r = .30 from 15 studies; intellectual stimulation, r = .22 from 14 studies; and
individualized consideration, r = .24 from 12 studies). The meta-analysis indicates that
the foundational assumptions in Adjekum’s model have widespread application and
appear to be valid.
Mullen and Kelloway (2009) indicate that further evidence is needed to better
comprehend the relationship and mechanism of transformational leadership over time. A
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longitudinal study by Franke and Felfe (2011) reported that transformational leadership
had positive effects on followers’ health in the short run but opposite effects in the long
run. The results are not surprising as exhaustion may set in due to over-commitment and
continuous effort required by the transformational leaders, resulting in adverse safety
outcomes.
Mirza & Isha (2017) added a twist to a systems-based approach to safety:
supervisory leadership style impacts safety outcomes, but a savvy safety leader should
also adapt their style to different circumstances. The researchers posit that both safety
and leadership research give too little attention to context. They state that three different
leadership styles are prevalent in high-reliability organizations: transformational
leadership, leader-member exchange (LMX), and transactional leadership.
Leader-member exchange (LMX) involves a dyadic relationship between a leader
and a follower. Pairs of folks build solid bonds and information flows freely between
them. High-quality LMX leads to better safety outcomes than low-quality LMX (Mirza
& Isha, 2017). In many ways, low-quality LMX resembles a more transactional approach
to leadership, so this initial view holds to the earlier discussion of the effectiveness of
transformational leadership. High-quality LMX is exhibited in a flying organization
when leadership listens to their crews, develops policy, process, and procedure that is
executable and reliable, and employees feel empowered to make a change. One
interesting study might involve parsing out the variance accounted for in the various
models between transformational leadership and LMX.
Taken by themselves, measures of transformational leadership, transactional
leadership, and LMX do not tell the whole story. Additionally, one should consider the
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organizational context when evaluating the effectiveness of a particular leadership style.
Mirza & Isha (2017) recommend a supervisor tailor their approach to safety leadership
based upon the organizational context of culture, structure, processes, and/or people.
Mirza and Isha’s research is not surprising, as much of what is known about
organizational behavior is strongly related to context. The researchers are very clear
when they point out that their model (as proposed above) is by no means exhaustive and
there is still room for substantial study.
Transformational Leadership Measures and Safety Outcomes
Chen and Chen (2014) carried out an integrated study that considers three
antecedents of pilot safety-related behavior, including organizational, group, and
individual factors (Figure 7). Specifically, their research examines the impact of pilots’
perceptions of Safety Management System (SMS) practices, fleet managers’ morality
leadership, and pilots’ self-efficacy on flight crews’ safety behaviors through the
mediation of safety motivation. Using a sample of 239 commercial pilot participants, and
the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) technique, the results indicate that both
perceptions of SMS practices and self-efficacy have direct, positive effects on pilots’
safety behaviors, while the effect of fleet managers’ morality leadership on such behavior
is fully mediated by pilots’ safety motivation.
Chen & Chen’s (2014) research served as part of the foundation of Adjekum’s
(2017) model regarding the relationship between SMS perception, safety motivation, and
safety participation. Note the further similarity in this model of the concept of safety
behavior as quantified by safety participation and safety compliance. Chen & Chen also
pointed out the issue of the cultural setting in their study, as the power-distance
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relationship in a Taiwanese carrier may not be representative of the flight deck culture at
all carriers (2014).
Figure 7
Chen & Chen’s conceptual model (2014).

Chen & Chen’s (2014) study predicted a positive correlation between pilot
perceptions of the SMS practices within their airlines and motivation to perform related
safety behaviors. Since the researchers assume that safety motivation mediates the
relationship between the selected antecedents and pilots’ safety behaviors, the direct and
indirect effects of SMS practices on safety outcomes are hypothesized as follows: pilot
perceptions of their airline SMS practices are positively associated with their safety
motivation; pilots’ perceptions of their airline SMS practices are positively associated
with their safety compliance and safety participation; and pilots’ safety motivation
mediates the relationship between their perceptions of their airlines’ SMS practices and
safety behaviors--both compliance and participation (Chen & Chen, 2014)). Adjekum
carries the same view forward into his research, and like Chen & Chen, his study
produces similar results.
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Shen, Ju, Koh, Rowlinson, & Bridge (2017) examine the relationship between
transformational leadership and safety outcomes in a construction environment. Shen et
al. (2017) posited safety behavior was an interaction between proximal individual
differences (safety knowledge and safety motivation) and distal contextual factors
(leadership and safety climate). In line with other studies examined thus far, the
researchers took social context into effect, as well.
Given the cultural background of the sample, their study makes a slight
modification to the conceptualization and view of transformational leadership as an
antecedent of safety climate. Shen et. al. (2017) established multiple mediator models
showing the mechanisms through which transformational leadership translates into safety
behavior. The multiple mediator models were assessed using the structural equation
modeling (SEM) technique and individual questionnaire responses from a random sample
of construction personnel based in Hong Kong.
The results of the study indicate transformational leadership has a significant
impact on safety climate, which is mediated by safety-specific leader-member exchange
(LMX). Shen et al. (2017) state safety climate in turn impacts safety behavior through
safety knowledge. The results suggest that future safety climate interventions should be
more effective if supervisors exhibit transformational leadership, encourage construction
personnel to voice safety concerns without fear of retaliation, and repeatedly remind them
about safety on the job (Shen et al., 2017).
Shen et al. (2017) backed the general premises of Adjekum’s (2017) work
regarding a relationship between transformational safety leadership (TSL) and safety
outcomes (safety participation and safety compliance). However, rather than the safety
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motivation moderator variable discussed by Adjekum, Shen et al. (2017) proposed TSL is
moderated by leader-member exchange (LMX) to produce a safety climate which then
impacts safety outcomes (either via safety knowledge which impacts safety compliance
or safety motivation which impacts safety participation--see Figure 8 below).
Figure 8
Final structural model (Shen et al., 2017).

There are many similarities between Adjekum and Shen et al.’s (2017) models-namely the foundational basis for variables like safety compliance, safety participation,
and safety motivation. Yet there are key differences, as well. Shen et al. (2017) posited
safety culture is a moderator variable in their model connecting TSL to safety
participation and safety compliance. Adjekum (2014a) does not call out safety culture
per se as a variable in his model. However, when discussing the Safety Management
System construct Adjekum’s (2014a) work points to the theoretical positive impact of
SMS on safety culture.
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Both models posit a mediating effect for safety motivation. It is interesting to
note that Chen & Chen (2014) demonstrated a weak, directionally appropriate
relationship between safety motivation and safety participation (r = 0.28, p < .01) and a
strong, directionally appropriate relationship between safety motivation and safety
compliance (r = 0.70, p < .01). Adjekum (2014a) found a weak, directionally expected
relationship between safety motivation and safety participation (r = 0.29, p < .001) and a
weak, directionally appropriate relationship between safety motivation and safety
compliance (r = 0.23, p < .001). Shen et al. (2017) did not find a significant relationship
between safety motivation, safety participation, and/or safety compliance.
Also of interest is the relationship between safety leadership and safety
motivation. Chen & Chen (2014) found a weak, directionally appropriate relationship
between morality leadership and safety motivation (r = 0.25, p < .05). Adjekum’s
research found a weak, directionally unexpected relationship between transformational
safety leadership and safety motivation (r = - 0.13, p < .05). Shen et al. (2017) found a
moderate, directionally appropriate relationship between transformational safety
leadership (via safety specific LMX and safety climate) and safety motivation (r = 0.61, p
< .01). Thus, there is still room for further research regarding the relationship between
transformational safety leadership and safety outcomes moderated by safety motivation.
Other researchers have continued to explore the connection between
transformational leadership and positive safety outcomes. Jiang and Probst (2016)
examined the relationship between leadership style and safety knowledge and safety
participation. They confirmed safety knowledge and safety motivation were positively
related to safety participation. Additionally, though passive leadership and safety
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participation is not related, transformational leadership (TL) and safety participation (SP)
are positively related. And finally, TSL moderated the relationship between SM and SP
(Jiang and Probst, 2016). Thus, in high TSL settings, folks with high SM demonstrated
high SP. Additionally, when TSL was low, there was no relationship between SM and
SP (Jiang and Probst, 2016).
Cavazotte et al. (2021) researched authentic leadership. The researchers found
leader selflessness and morality can influence safety outcomes, by improving employee
psychological capital (PsyCap) and organizational citizenship (exhibited by organization
citizenship behaviors or OCB). Both PsyCap and OCB influence safety performance.
However, PsyCap influences safety compliance (but OCB does not). Figure 9 depicts the
model examined by Cavazotte et al. (2021).
Recent Challenges to Transformational Safety Leadership
There is by no means unanimity on the effectiveness of the measures of
transformational leadership and/or its efficacy.
Cho et al. (2018) examined the unique effects of ethical leadership while
controlling for various aspects of the Full Range Leadership Model (FRLM). The
researchers found that both affective commitment and normative commitment were
influenced by ethical leadership, controlling for the components of the FRLM. Thus,
other external factors to the FRLM might have a significant impact on team members.
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Figure 9
Model depicting the relationship between authentic leadership and safety outcomes
(Cavazotte et al., 2021).

Authentic leadership also impacts safety climate and outcomes. Borgersen et al.
(2019) found authentic leadership made a significant contribution to explaining variance
in safety culture in a maritime setting. Leaders who demonstrated authentic leadership
through balanced processing internalized moral perspective, relational transparency, and
self-awareness were given higher total safety climate scores from their team than those
who did not (Borgersen et al., 2019).
Cavazotte et al. (2021) researched authentic leadership (as discussed earlier). In
their study, psychological capital and organizational citizenship behaviors impacted
safety participation and safety compliance. Thus, there might be other relevant factors
that must be considered when examining safety outcomes. Figure 9 depicts the
relationship between authentic leadership and safety compliance and safety participation.
Not all research is completed from the leader’s point of view.

Joubert and

Feldman (2017) conducted a study in an air traffic services environment. Their
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ethnographic study gathered leadership experiences and expectations from team
members, to determine their effect (if any) on leadership effectiveness and development.
Their results reflected personnel preferred the positive support aspects of
transformational leadership as followers (Joubert & Feldman, 2017). The researchers
posit the organization should focus on ensuring the employee support and growth aspects
of transformational leadership are incorporated into leadership training (Joubert &
Feldman, 2017).
Opera et al. (2020) researched team member job crafting outcomes (specifically
job demands, and job resources made by employees) while working for a
transformational leader, a transactional leader, or a laissez-faire leader. Results confirm
one should consider the leadership style of a supervisor as it can directly impact the job
shaping behaviors of teams (Opera et al., 2020).
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS)
The Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS)
was developed by Adjekum (2014) and used to examine the relationship between safety
culture and various aspects of the implementation of a Safety Management System in a
collegiate environment (Adjekum et al., 2016, Adjekum, 2017; Robertson, 2016).
Robertson (2018) also examined the relationship between an organization’s safety culture
and SMS implementation in a collegiate setting.
Measuring safety culture is a key aspect component of continuous improvement
within an SMS. Many studies have assessed safety culture in a variety of organizations,
but few studies exist which examined the relationship between SMS implementation and
its impact on developing a strong safety culture (McNeely, 2012).
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According to AC 120-92B (FAA, 2015): “Cultures are the product of the values
and actions of the organization’s leadership as well as the results of organizational
learning. Cultures are not really ‘created’ or ‘implemented’, they emerge over time and as
a result of experience. Organizations cannot simply purchase a software program,
produce a set of posters filled with buzzwords, require their people to attend an hour of
slide presentations, and instantly install an effective SMS. As with the development of
any skill, it takes time, practice and repetition, the appropriate attitude, a cohesive
approach, and constant coaching from involved mentors.’’ (p. 3). Robertson stated: “SMS
was not designed to create a ‘culture of safety,’ an SMS was designed to build upon and
improve an existing ‘culture of safety’’’ (2018).
Adjekum and Tous (2020a) examined four key management factors they posited
to have a significant predictive relationship regarding resilient safety culture: principles,
policy, procedure, and practice. Using SEM-PA, the researchers found that policy had the
highest predictive power, and practices was the weakest. Thus, resilient safety culture is
influenced by policies, procedures, and principles (Adjekum & Tous, 2020a).
Adjekum and Tous (2020b) researched the role of cultural drivers in
organizational resilience in a collegiate setting. Three cultural drivers (commitment,
cognizance, and competence) were found to have a strong significant relationship
between the three aforementioned factors and safety resilience. Additionally, using
SEM-PA, commitment was found to significantly mediate the path between cognizance
and competence (Adjekum & Tous, 2020b). Finally, the perception of organization
resilience by flight operations and ground operations personnel was significantly higher
than that of senior leaders (Adjekum & Tous, 2020). Both studies provided valuable
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insights into the relationship between factors that influence SMS and those that influence
safety culture.
Transformational Safety Leadership and Safety Performance
Transformational Safety Leadership is a variable that potentially influences safety
behavior and safety-related outcomes like violations, incidents, and accidents (i.e.,
outcomes impacted by the health of a carrier’s SMS). In studies by Zohar (2002, 2010)
for example, the role of leadership is emphasized as a factor in improving safety.
Additionally, studies by Barling, Loughlin and Kelloway (2002) indicate a positive
influence on the effect of transformational leadership on safety promotion. Kelloway,
Mullen, and Francis (2006) posit safety specific transformational leadership has a
positive effect on organizational safety--to include perceived safety climate, safety
events, and safety consciousness. In their 2006 study, Clarke and Ward demonstrated
transformational safety leadership is positively related to employee safety participation.
Other researchers have continued the connection between transformational
leadership and positive safety outcomes. Jiang and Probst (2016) examined the
relationship between leadership style and safety knowledge and safety participation.
They confirmed safety knowledge and safety motivation were positively related to safety
participation. Additionally, though passive leadership and safety participation is not
related, transformational leadership (TL) and safety participation (SP) are positively
related. And finally, TSL moderated the relationship between SM and SP (Jiang and
Probst, 2016). Thus, in high TSL settings, folks with high SM demonstrated high SP.
Additionally, when TSL was low, there was no relationship between SM and SP (Jiang
and Probst, 2016).
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Farahnak et al. (2020) examined the relationship between transformational
leadership (TL), attitudes towards change, and implementation success of evidence-based
practice (EBP) in the mental health field. The researchers found positive relationships
between transformational leadership and staff attitudes toward EBP, as well as staff
attitudes toward EBP and implementation success (Farahnak et al., 2020). Results also
supported an indirect relationship between transformational leadership and
implementation success through employees’ attitudes toward EBP. The results suggest
that the leader’s behaviors are likely more critical to innovation implementation than the
leader’s attitudes (Farahnak et al., 2020).
Hussain et al. (2021) reported a high degree of transformational leadership can
increase job satisfaction and organizational commitment. In their meta-analysis, they
found in 13 of 19 valid cases, transformational leadership and job satisfaction were
positively related, and in 11 of 13 valid cases, transformational leadership and
organizational commitment were positively related.
Irshad et al. (2021) reported the use of transformational leadership in a healthcare
setting enhanced caregiver psychological well-being by mediating the perceived impact
of Covid-19 (thus providing better availability of caregivers for patients). Specifically,
for those healthcare providers with low safety consciousness, the level of
transformational safety leadership (TSL) had no impact on their perceived risk from
Covid-19. However, high levels of TSL coupled with high safety consciousness led to a
significantly lower perception by employees regarding their specific risk from Covid-19
(Irshad, 2021).
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Senior Leadership Attitudes towards Safety and Safety Culture Perception of
Personnel
There is a strong body of research connecting the attitudes of senior leadership
and the safety culture perception and outcomes of personnel. In their 2001 work,
Helmreich & Merritt found a strong positive correlation between organizational
leadership’s commitment to safety (or pilot perception thereof) and pilot safety practices
and norms. Simon posits a key indicator of senior management's commitment to safety is
the adequacy of resources, including financial support and their active involvement in
safety initiatives (2009). Thus, leadership’s involvement becomes very clear to
employees, leading to positive safety outcomes.
Research has demonstrated senior leadership’s attitude toward safety directly
impacts safety climate and outcomes. Borgersen et al. (2019) found authentic leadership
made a significant contribution to explaining variance in safety culture in a maritime
setting. Leaders who demonstrated authentic leadership through balanced processing
internalized moral perspective, relational transparency, and self-awareness were given
higher total safety climate scores from their team than those who did not (Borgersen et
al., 2019).
Gerede (2015) posited SMS implementation is impacted by the support senior
leadership gave to the initiative and safety initiatives in general. Due to the
transformational nature of SMS itself (seeing the world for what it is rather than what one
desires it to be), a high degree of effort may be required for SMS to be successful. Key
components of an effective implementation include senior leadership support, support
from the regulator, effective training, and the integration of multiple SMSs of stakeholder
organizations (Gerede, 2015).
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Studies in the firefighting arena also have demonstrated the positive impact of
transformational safety leadership (TSL) on crew use of personal protective equipment
(PPE). Smith et al. (2020) found that amongst firefighters, TSL had a positive impact on
safety motivation (SM). SM was found to have a significant and large impact on PPE
use. Finally, the compound impact of TSL on SM which impacts PPE use was
significant (Smith et al., 2020).
Cavazotte et al. (2021) researched the role of authentic leadership on safety
participation (SP) and safety compliance (SC). The researchers found senior leader
selflessness and morality can influence safety outcomes, by improving employee
psychological capital (PsyCap) and organizational citizenship (exhibited by organization
citizenship behaviors, also known as OCB). Both PsyCap and OCB influence SP.
However, PsyCap influences SC, but OCB does not (Cavazotte et al., 2021).
Underlying Theories of Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior, and Safety Performance
Commercial aviation in the United States is as safe as it has ever been (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2021). Much of the credit for the high level of safety in the
commercial arena falls to the pilots. The following section is a brief overview of the
theoretical underpinnings of why pilots exhibit safety-related behavior.
Skinner’s Operant Learning Theory
Operant Learning Theory states behavior is a function of a person's environment
and can be modified by manipulating the consequences of behavior (Skinner, 1953).
Thus, behavior with positive reinforcement (a desirable outcome) tends to increase in
frequency, versus behavior with negative reinforcement (undesirable outcome or
punishment) tends to decrease in frequency (Skinner, 1953).
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In the realm of Part 121 operations and safety, pilots will tend to exhibit behaviors
that result in desirable outcomes (i.e., respecting the operational policy and the flight
manual limits of the aircraft, both result in a positive outcome). Operant Learning
Theory would also predict pilots will avoid behaviors that might result in a negative
outcome.
The theory may be challenged a bit in the case of a novel situation or one in
which a Pilot cannot clearly determine an outcome. Additionally, a pilot may “press a
limit” or allow their standards to creep in such a way that over time she may engage in
behavior without an accurate perception of risk due to the lack of negative outcomes
when the behavior was done in the past. Thus, an illusion of invulnerability can occur
(Reason, 2008).
Thorndike’s Reinforcement Theory
Thorndike’s Reinforcement Theory states behavioral responses to stimuli that are
followed by a satisfactory response will be strengthened, but responses that are followed
by discomfort or a negative outcome will be weakened (Nevin, 1999). The focus is
behavior and its outcomes, based upon reinforcement (which can be positive or negative).
Positive reinforcement can take many forms in Part 121 operational world. Public
recognition, cash incentives, even small gifts or “badges” have been associated with
increased safety behavior in an organization. Awards given for a certain period of
incident-free operation (a desirable outcome), if seen as a positive outcome by the
recipient (positive reinforcement), can lead to an increase in desired safety performance
(Mazur, 2013).
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Negative reinforcement (or avoidance) refers to consequences that are not
perceived as desirable. These consequences are associated with certain behaviors, and
the theory states the pilot will not perform the undesirable behavior in an effort to avoid
less than desirable consequences. Examples of negative reinforcement might be a call
from the FOQA Gatekeeper for an exceedance detected by aircraft electronic data
(slightly undesirable) to suspension or termination due to a wanton or reckless violation
of policy or procedure (a very undesirable outcome). Thus, the theory states a pilot will
gravitate toward positive reinforcement and avoid negative reinforcement. One might
find positive and negative reinforcement is too simplistic and the approach does not
always work. Other factors such as punishment and extinction should also be considered
(Mazur, 2013). Additionally, such strategies might not always be employed. Ground
Crews might take risks because of poor procedures, technology, etc. to improve turn
times to receive a bonus, despite the potential negative outcomes if the gambit fails
(Greenberg, 2013).
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
All human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, lower-level factors need to
be satisfied before higher-level needs can be satisfied (motivation is derived from the
need to satisfy lower-level needs enroute to satisfying higher-level needs). Thus, if one
can identify and satisfy lower-level needs, then higher-level needs can be addressed
(Maslow, 1970).
In the case of Part 121 operations, if pilots feel like their contract is adequate
regarding terms of employment, they are supported by leadership, and the company backs
up their decisions when flying the line, more desirable safety outcomes occur. On the
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contrary, if the lower-level needs of a pilot are not met (i.e., the pilot is distracted by
needs not being fulfilled because of a sub-par contract or they do not feel supported by
leadership regarding operational decision making) one might expect a lower level of
safety outcomes.
Vroom’s Expectancy Theory
Vroom’s Expectancy Theory focuses on behavior based on conscious internal
choices to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, rather than the impact of external
outcomes. The theory separates effort (which arises from motivation), performance, and
outcomes. Individual performance is looked at holistically, based on individual factors
such as personality, skills, knowledge, experience, and abilities (Vroom, 1964).
Vroom’s theory attempts to account for the richness of individual differences
amongst personnel. Specifically, the variables of expectancy, instrumentality, and
valence are tied to motivation (Vroom, 1964). Personnel change their level of effort
based upon their assessment of the value of the "bonus" they might receive, and their
perception of the link between effort and outcome. (Bandura, 1986; Greenberg, 2013).
In a Part 121 setting, leadership must closely connect rewards with specific safety-related
behavior while ensuring Pilots want these rewards. A clear relationship between
behavior and reward must be established, and pilots must unequivocally see that their
safety-related behavior will result in the desired reward.
Herzberg’s Two Factor Theory
Herzberg’s Motivational Theory or Two-Factor Theory is another important
foundational element that supports safety motivation and safety behavior. Herzberg
posits a person is motivated to act to satisfy individual needs and desires. Motivation can
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be split into two major categories: Hygiene factors and mptivation factors (Greenberg,
2013). Hygiene factors are necessary (but not sufficient) for job satisfaction. Motivation
factors lead to job satisfaction. Hygiene factors include supervision, interpersonal
relationships, physical working conditions, and salary. Motivational factors include
achievement, advancement, recognition, and responsibility (Greenberg, 2013).
Herzberg's theory is limited in that it does not consider an individual's expectancy.
It is not a given that well-motivated and satisfied personnel will demonstrate safe
behavior. If a pilot's expectancy is low regarding the potential certain behavior will bring
a valued result, variance in performance and effort to achieve the desired result will occur
(Mazur, 2013).
Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
Another foundational element of safety motivation, safety behavior, and safety
performance is Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). TBP considers the
psychological aspects of human behavior. TBP considers the intentions behind human
action (Ajzen, 2005). Intentions are guided by different considerations: attitude toward
behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. Intentions can be predicted
with a high degree of accuracy by one's attitudes toward behavior, subjective norms, and
perceived behavioral control constructs. Perceived intentions, together with perceived
behavioral control, can explain variance in actual behavior (Ajzen, 2005).
Ajzen introduced the variable intention to strengthen the connection between
attitudes and behavior. Attitudes sometimes fail to result in behavior for a wide variety
of reasons. However, an individual's attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, and
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perceived behavioral control can be used to predict intentions that can predict safety
behavior (Fogarty and Shaw, 2009).
In a Part 121 setting, Ajzen’s work supports the premise that pilot attitude (as
measured by intention) can directly impact safety behavior and safety performance.
Thus, a carrier can assess the pilot’s attitude toward safety-related behaviors as a leading
indicator of safety-related outcomes.
McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y
McGregor offers two theories regarding employee motivation within
organizations, Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X: motivation occurs only at the
physiological and security levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (McGregor, 1960).
People must be closely controlled and often coerced. The main source of employee
motivation is money, followed by security. Theory Y: employees are motivated by
esteem and self-actualization. Employees are self-directed and will meet organizational
goals if committed to them. Employee buy-in is needed (McGregor, 1960).
In the Part 121 arena, aspects of both approaches are impactful. Employee
involvement in setting safety policies and processes tends to be more effective than a
purely punitive approach (Sorenson, 2015).
Behavior-Based Safety and Safety Compliance Theory
There is a deep body of research connecting an individual’s perception to their
behavior. Studies have shown interventions and strategies that aim at positively
influencing personnel behavior (and perception of said behavior) will ensure safety
performance meets safety goals and objectives (Yates, 2015).
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In the realm of safety-related behavior, research indicates a perception of risk
affects the likelihood of certain behaviors. BBS or Behavior-Based Safety within the
organization is one good example of connecting perception with the outcome. BehaviorBased Safety (BBS) and safety behavior modification involve a continuous focus of
attention on what people do and why they do it. Then, after the analysis of their safety
outcomes is complete, research can be accomplished to design a strategy to improve what
they do (Cooper, 2009; Geller, 2004).
Other research stresses a behavior modification approach to enforce discipline and
drive behavior. And though there has been documented effectiveness of this approach
(Cooper, 2009), SMS per se is not purely a behavior modification system. Rather it is a
holistic approach to safety, and it needs to take into consideration the workarounds,
potential intentional violations, and other non-compliant behaviors behavior that impact
performance in a large organization (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).
Person-Centered Safety Theory
Heinrich's Domino Theory of Accident Causation posits an accident only occurs
because of the result of a human or mechanical failure. Thus, the hazard only exists
because of the actions of careless people or poorly designed equipment (Hollnagel,
2009). Thus, attention to the humans in the system (both at the design phase and in the
execution phase of the operation) is warranted. Accordingly, enforcement methods such
as punishment can be effective in modifying behavior and outcomes if applied correctly
(Holden, 2009).
Greenberg (2013) recommends a system of punishment for non-compliance or
unsafe acts to send a clear signal to the workgroup that such actions will not be tolerated.
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These punishments should be graduated, tied to the severity of the outcome of the action,
and they should be applied consistently. Communication regarding the reason for the
punishment (to the offender and the entire group) is also very important to ensure the
workgroup understands the connection between action and outcome (Greenberg, 2013).
The challenge with Greenberg’s approach is in the application: how does an enterprise
develop and administer a system to effectively monitor the behavior and administer
punishment without destroying other important areas of organizational health?
Organizational and Systems-Centered Theory
In contrast to the proponents of People-Centered Theory, experts like Reason
(2008) and Dekker (2011, 2014) posit accidents are caused by multiple factors and
incidents occur because of the complex interactions of numerous work system elements
involving both human and non-human components. Dekker (2014) does not support
punishment as a safety behavior modification tool, especially in high-reliability
organizations like aviation, healthcare, and nuclear power.
Dekker (2014) states an interesting premise: punishment is tied to the outdated
theory which focuses on poor human performance. This belief derives from a
supposition that both the system and the equipment are inherently safe, and people are the
least reliable component. Punishment masks the fact that the system and/or the
equipment might also bear much of the blame for an accident. Punishment emphasizes
that failures are deviant behavior, and it does not recognize the role that drift, and
deviance play in all systems. The consideration that deviance and drift can exist in all
systems is a crucial foundational principle of Safety Management Systems (Dekker,
2014).
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Human Factors Theory
According to Goetsch (2010), accidents are generally a result entirely of human
error. The errors result from overloading human capabilities, environmental factors
(heat, noise, distractions), situational factors (unclear instructions or risk level), and/or
personal factors (individual issues with family, life, etc., or emotional stress).
Additionally, Yates (2015) posits human error results when personnel undertake tasks
without requisite or sufficient training, and/or unfamiliarity with equipment and
procedures, as well as misjudging risk resulting in unsafe activities.
Multiple factors such as deadlines, peer pressure, and budget may cause a person
to decide unconsciously or consciously to deviate from the process or procedure (Yates,
2015). Additionally, Human Factors Theory makes a connection between management
and the operation regarding setting policy, procedures, training, and follow-up.
Management is also responsible for enforcing standards and carrying out and
documenting corrective actions--most of the components of the SMS construct (Yates,
2015).
Person Attribution Theory
Person Attribution Theory states that variability in human behavior can be
modified with blame and punishment (Reason 2000, 2008). Proponents of this theory
support the use of fear, disciplinary measures, litigation, retraining, and shaming to drive
desired behavior.
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Petersen’s Accident/Incident Theory
Petersen’s Accident/Incident Theory takes the Human Factors Theory a step
further. Human Factors Theory extends to include additional elements: ergonomic traps,
the decision to err, and system failures (Goetsch, 2010).
The Bad Apple Theory of safety management focuses on the identification and
removal of unreliable human operators within the system.

The Bad Apple Theory posits

the system is essentially safe and success is intrinsic so long as a human does not deviate.
This view is known as the "old view" of human error (Reason, 2008). The "old view' of
human error states the major threat to safety is the inherent unreliability of people in the
system. An acceptable level of safety performance can be achieved if the system is
shielded from human vagaries through selection, proceduralization, automation, training,
and discipline (Dekker, 2014).
Relationship between Pilot Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation, and Safety Behavior
Multiple studies have indicated that individual self-efficacy (SE) can be a reliable
predictor of the work-related behavior of pilots (see Parasuraman, Molly & Singh, 1993;
Prinzel, 2002). Additionally, current research suggests that high levels of self-efficacy
are directly related to pilot perception regarding goal achievement and the level of effort
spent on improving work-related and management performance (Schwarzer & Jerusalem,
1995).
Ji et al. (2017) found an interesting permutation on the relationship between SE
and student pilot situational awareness. In their study, concern over mistakes and
personal standards had direct effects on flying cadets' situational judgment. Additionally,
concern over mistakes, parental expectations, and organization had indirect effects on
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flying cadets’ situational judgment through safety motivation. And finally, concern over
mistakes and parental criticism had indirect effects on self-efficacy (Ji et al., 2017).
The positive relationship between SE and SC is normally welcome and leads to
positive safety outcomes. However, Prinzel (2002) pointed out that employees with high
self-efficacy might be extremely goal-oriented at the expense of general safety
procedures. Under a certain set of conditions (high pressure, tight budget, etc.) some
employees with high self-efficacy may decide to disregard proper procedures. Under
Petersen’s Accident Theory, such behavior is termed the “Superman Syndrome.” To
avoid this negative outcome, employees should be engaged to equip them with a sense of
process ownership and peer review.
Ślazyk-Sobol et al. (2021) engaged ground crew in a Polish aviation environment
(ground handling personnel, firefighters, engineers, mechanics, and electricians) to
explore the relationship between self-efficacy, levels of work stress, and attitudes towards
safety-related behaviors at work. Using a survey instrument, the researchers found sense
of effectiveness was an important mediator between a participant’s level of perceived
stress and their attitudes toward safety. Namely, as the subjectively perceived sense of
self-efficacy increased, the level of experienced stress decreased. Thus, a participant’s
positive attitude toward safe actions and behaviors in the workplace is strengthened
(Ślazyk-Sobol et al., 2021).
Cayir and Ulupinar (2021) examined the relationship between self-efficacy, using
educational skills, and perceptions regarding performance amongst nurses. A predictive
relationship was found between the nursing instructors' educational skills, general selfefficacy perceptions, and performance. Participant perceptions of general self-efficacy
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and performance increased as their frequency of using educational skills increased, and
their performance increased as their perceptions of general self-efficacy increased.
Differences were also noted by gender, age, years of experience in the job, and level of
educational experience (Cayir & Ulupinar, 2021).
Other researchers (Schunk & Pajares (2001) and Graham and Weiner (1995))
determined self-efficacy can be a reliable predictor of behavior and behavioral change.
The Challenge of the Behavior-Based Approaches and Error Management in SMS
The debate continues on the best approach to fully understand the causes of
accidents and incidents, to positively impact the humans in the system and the system in
which they operate. The theories of Safety I and Safety II (and their relationship to
Resilience Engineering) are briefly discussed as potential enablers regarding the
effectiveness of an SMS in an organization.
Safety I and Safety II / Resilience Engineering
Rather than focusing on the lack of negative outcomes (generally known as
accidents and/or incidents, and connected to technological failure, human failure, and/or
organizational system failure), Hollnagel (2014) proposes that safety scientists should
focus on what goes right. Simply put, Safety I is then described as keeping the number of
adverse outcomes as low as possible. Safety-II is defined as: “…the ability to succeed
under expected and unexpected conditions alike so that the number of intended and
acceptable consequences is as high as possible” (Hollnagel, 2014, p. 23). The definition
of Safety-II is very similar to the definition of resilience in resilience engineering
(Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011).
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Thus, Safety II studies the operationalization of safety or applied safety in the
organization (Hollnagel, 2014). The connection between the focus on Safety II and the
proactive nature of SMS (especially with its implication on continuous improvement) is
undeniable and worthy of consideration in the context of this work.
Just Culture
Just Culture refers to a framework within an organization that fosters a culture of
trust, learning, and accountability. A Just Culture framework outlines the processes by
which employees report safety issues, the disposition of the data, the management
process to determine if employee conduct was an honest mistake, at-risk behavior, or
negligent/reckless behavior, and the mechanism to ensure oversight of the process.
Sydney Dekker opines in a contribution Just Culture: Restoring Trust and Accountability
to Your Organization that: “…a Just Culture framework foster improved morale,
employee commitment to the organization, job satisfaction, and willingness to do that
“little extra” or step outside of their role” (Dekker, 2017, p. xiii).
In the same vein as Safety I versus Safety II, leaders of high-reliability
organizations face a choice when dealing with accidents or incidents. Regarding the
employees involved in a safety escape, leaders can choose to take either a punitive or
retributive approach, or a healing and learning-based or restorative approach. Dekker
posits that an organization must clearly answer two questions related to addressing issues
on “who was hurt (first victims, second victims, the organizational community) and what
are their needs” (Dekker, 2017, p. 13).
Just Culture is complimentary to an SMS regarding the systematic evaluation of
both the latent conditions and human actions surrounding a safe escape. Both
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frameworks espouse a reporting culture, and both embed continuous improvement as an
outcome (FAA 2013, 2019). In practice, the relationships between the regulator and the
organization and the organization’s leadership and its employees are crucial. Dekker
posits: “Unjust responses to incidents are less likely the result of bad judgment calls by
those involved in that aftermath” (2017, p. 144). At times, it is the building of this trust
within the organization that can stymie the implementation of a Just Culture system.
Summary and Conclusions
The literature review serves as a foundation for the work in this study. By no
means is the literature review a complete review of SMS metrics, models addressing the
relationship between safety behaviors and attitudes with safety outcomes, nor the
potential further contribution of the examination of safety culture and SMS outcomes.
Rather, the literature review helps connect core concepts with the model proposed in this
(and previous work), while highlighting the need to further research the aforementioned
variables in a commercial aviation or 14 CFR Part 121 environment. The importance of
metrics regarding the measurement of the effectiveness of an SMS cannot be
overstated—as part of a performance-based scheme, an operator and the regulator must
continuously evaluate the functionality of a carrier’s SMS. The intent is to develop an
objective, rather than subjective assessment tool.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This study utilized a concurrent triangulation mixed methods approach to examine
the relationships between SMS initiatives (SMS policy implementation and SMS process
engagement), safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation, safety-related events,
and safety behavior (as evidenced by safety compliance and safety participation) at a 14
CFR Part 121 U.S. commercial carrier. The measurement model proposed in this study is
an extension of Adjekum’s (2017) final measurement model designed to examine the
same variables in a collegiate aviation setting (14 CFR Part 141).
This study is designed to fill a gap in research on SMS initiatives in U.S.
commercial aviation operations, add to existing literature, and further quantify the
relationship between the study variables by using a holistic concurrent triangulation
approach. Finally, this study intended to provide an objective measure for air carriers to
use as part of the assessment and continuous improvement of their SMS.
As discussed earlier in this work, a quantitative survey instrument and qualitative
semi-structured interviews were used to gather data to compare to objective company
safety outcomes and artifacts. The quantitative survey contained 42 items, designed to
examine the relations between the perceptions of company line and check pilots on SMS
process engagement (SMSPro), SMS policy implementation (SMSPol), transformational
safety leadership (TSL), self-efficacy (SE), safety related events
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(SE), safety participation (SP), and safety compliance (SC). Please see Appendix A and
Chapter One of this paper for a more in-depth discussion of the various dimensions and
the validated scales.
The hypothesized measurement model was evaluated using Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM/Path Analysis (PA)) to
determine the strength of relationships among the variables while simultaneously
determining the quality of the measurement model used in the study. The relationship
between the safety indicators obtained from the surveys and safety outcomes (selfreported safety events) was explored, as well.
Selected company leadership personnel were concurrently assessed using semistructured interviews to understand their perspectives on the state of the SMS and the
implementation of the program (Maxwell, 2005; Glesne, 2011). The primary purpose of
this portion of the study was the identification of any gaps in the perceptions of senior
leaders and those of the front line regarding the health and efficacy of the company’s
SMS. More detail on the survey participants can be found in the Methodology section of
this paper.
Comparison of safety artifacts, objective safety data, and the reflections captured
in the semi-structured interviews provided insight into the accuracy of the perceptions of
senior leadership regarding the functionality of their SMS. This analysis aimed to
highlight potential blind spots or gaps in senior leadership’s assessment of their SMS and
its implementation.
The final step of the process involved a triangulation approach, designed to
consolidate the data gathered from the quantitative online survey of line pilots and check
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pilots regarding the study variables, the holistic themes which emerged from the semistructured interviews of company leaders on SMS efficacy and implementation, and
company artifacts and safety performance indicators. Multiple company safety
performance indicators were used, including normalized data on safety reporting by
crews, SMS training data, company safety reports, and other flight-related performance
indicators.
Research Design
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach
A concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach was utilized to gather both
quantitative and qualitative data using a variety of techniques during a fixed period. The
examination of the data, along with corporate artifacts and objective safety outcomes
allows one to make holistic inferences regarding the efficacy of SMS implementation
(Wahyuni, 2012).
Respondent data was examined for convergence or divergence regarding the study
variables and objective safety artifacts to provide a holistic view of the functioning of the
carrier’s SMS. Safety artifacts included aggregate assurance data that objectively captured
the safety performance of the airline. The same approach could be utilized at regular
intervals to allow for a longitudinal study, as well.
The concurrent triangulation strategy has been effectively used before in the
literature to holistically analyze similar variables in a collegiate environment (Adjekum
& Jensen, 2016). Concurrent means the quantitative data, qualitative data, and evidence
from company artifacts (documentary data) will be gathered over a fixed period in the
organization’s history, thus providing a single snapshot for analysis.
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The results will be compared to determine if convergence, divergence, or some
combinations exist regarding the survey data from line employees, interview data from
management, and objective company safety data. Where convergence exists, the
company may take some confidence in the effectiveness of their SMS program, and
possibly consider reinforcing these positive measures using a Safety-II mindset. Where
divergence exists, potential gaps in a company’s SMS may be indicated, highlighting
areas of focus for the leadership and safety teams for deeper analysis.
The concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach generally uses separate
quantitative and qualitative methods to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with
the strength of the other (Creswell, 2009). Additionally, to derive the maximum
effectiveness of the approach when gathering data concurrently, equal weight should be
assigned across methods--even if skewness is detected in the data set (Plano, Clark &
Creswell, 2008).
Methodology
Population
The qualitative and quantitative phases of this effort used different pools of
respondents. The quantitative portion of the study utilized a within-case purposive
sample, made up of pilots at a large U.S. commercial carrier (N = 8,500). The population
is divided roughly equally regarding duty position: captain or first officer. Additionally,
there are approximately 300 check airmen in the pilot group at this carrier, as well. The
sample who was administered the quantitative instrument represented the line employee
level of the organization.
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The qualitative portion of the study utilized a purposive sampling of 12 high-level
leaders from multiple departments. Specific details regarding the respondents have been
left out at the request of the carrier. The selected company leadership positions included
a sampling of personnel from the carriers required 14 CFR Part 119 personnel and their
assistants, one individual from Air Ops, one from Technical Operations, three from
Operations Quality Assurance, and seven from Flight Operations Safety, Assurance,
and/or SMS. The company positions of those interviewed included Senior Director to
Manager, and all have authority, responsibility, and resources to manage within their
areas. Additionally, the Flight Ops SMS managers were responsible for all aspects of
implementation and execution of the SMS within the third-largest department at the
carrier (over 10,000 employees), behind only Ground Operations and Inflight Operations.
The Flight Ops managers supervised and accomplished safety risk management, safety
promotion, safety training, safety assurance, and several other tasks associated with the
carrier’s SMS. There were two females and ten males in the interview group. The
experience level of the personnel in the sample ranged from 12 to 25 years at the carrier.
The semi-structured interview questions can be found in Appendix A.
Sampling Procedures
Power Analysis and Sample Size Selection
The sample size required for empirical studies or measurement model assessments
can be approached from a variety of perspectives. Kim (2005) posits that estimates of
power and minimum sample size vary based on the choice of the index, the number of
observed variables, model degrees of freedom, and the magnitude of the covariation
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amongst the variables. Field (2018) simplifies the discussion by recommending
increasing the sample size to improve power.
Kline (2016) suggests consideration of the number of parameters in the model is
appropriate when considering smaller sample sizes--the larger the number of model
parameters, the larger the required sample size. Kline (2016) proposes that a sample of
10 respondents per parameter is reasonable, but 20 respondents per parameter ensures
adequate power for the analysis. Since this study contains 14 parameters, a minimum
sample size of 280 was deemed sufficient for this research.
Though the survey instrument would ensure coverage and randomization across
respondents, a purposive sampling plan limited the quantitative portion of the study to
only respondents who were on the pilot seniority list at the major U.S. carrier surveyed.
Non-pilots and other workgroups were not included in this research (but should be
considered for follow-up studies).
The purposive sample of management personnel included many of the relevant
leaders with roles in the carrier’s SMS. The holistic approach allowed a much richer
view of the perceptions of these leaders for comparison to both the results of the
quantitative data and the company artifacts.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
An Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the university was obtained
because the study involved the use of human subjects. Permission was also garnered
from the senior leadership of the commercial carrier to engage both line pilots and
applicable leaders involved with the company’s SMS.
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For the qualitative portion of the study, the link to a confidential Qualtrics®
generated online survey instrument was posted in the company-provided pilot weekly
update, accessible only via log-in by pilots on the seniority list. Once logged in to the
Qualtrics® survey, respondents were required to acknowledge their rights as study
participants and digitally sign a consent form.
Respondents who agreed to the consent form were allowed to complete the
survey. Respondents who did not complete the consent form were logged out.
Respondents who continued through the survey could stop at any time and quit the survey
without penalty or repercussions. The completed responses were stored in the secure
Qualtrics® online database in accordance with the terms of the IRB approval.
The semi-structured interviews were performed virtually, using a Microsoft
Teams® meeting. The interviewees were given sufficient notice (two weeks) of the
interview, along with the questionnaire for the interview and the IRB consent form.
Transcripts were generated by Microsoft Teams®, and the transcripts were provided to
the interviewees for authentication and validation of content. The validated content was
then reduced using in vivo coding and codes, categories, and themes to extract emergent
themes and classification.
The coding and classifications were completed using a mix of manual processes
and computer-assisted qualitative software (NVivo® software suite). Field notes were
also taken during the recording sessions to add clarifying details, rich text descriptions,
and in situ researcher observations (Saldaña and Omasta, 2017).
The carrier authorized the use of de-identified aggregate safety performance data
for use in the study. This data included: the total number of Safety Reporting System
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(SRS) reports submitted by year (2016-2021) across the entire enterprise; SRS reports
submitted by workgroup over the same period; the number of Aviation Safety Action
Program (ASAP) reports filed (2015-2021); the ASAP filing rate per 10,000 hours of
flight time and per 10,000 flights (2016-2021); the number of personnel trained in SMS
by year (2016-2021); the number of new hazards identified (2016-2021); and the number
of new Operational Risk Registry entries (2016-2021). This data provides good insight
into the safety culture and reporting culture of the carrier, and it serves as potential
confirmatory evidence regarding the effectiveness of a carrier’s SMS. This data formed
the third component of the triangulation process while providing insight into the overall
function of the carrier’s SMS (Creswell, 2009; Patankar et al., 2012).
Demographic Details
Demographic details such as age, gender, pilot seat, years at the company, and
first exposure to SMS were gathered from study participants. The demographic
information gathered helped to identify individual differences regarding the study
variables across respondents. Per the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, no
identifying data was gathered as part of the study. The field notes and transcripts of the
qualitative portion of the study were retained per the terms of the IRB policy.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
All constructs of the study are discussed below. A five-point Likert scale (1 =
Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree or 1 = Extremely Rare to 5 = Very Frequent)
was utilized. Upon the completion of data collection, composite reliability was assessed,
using a minimum value of Cronbach’s alpha ≥ 0.70 (Field, 2018). The quantitative
survey can be found in its entirety in Appendix B.
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Perceptions of SMS Initiative
SMS - perceptions of the SMS initiative (SMS process engagement (SMSPro) and
SMS policy implementation (SMSPol), 6 items each) were measured by 12 final
measurement model items developed by Adjekum (2017). Alpha coefficients of .93
(SMSPol) and .75 (SMSPro) were reported for this instrument (Adjekum, 2017).
A typical item in the SMSPol group (responses were limited to a 5-point Likert
scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5): Safety professionals with the
appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience conduct SMS training.
A typical item in the SMSPro group (responses were limited to a 5-point Likert
scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5): Safety concerns reported through
the safety reporting system are corrected in a timely manner.
Transformational Safety Leadership
Transformational safety leadership – contained 6 items adopted from the Survey
of Transformational Leadership (STL) developed by Edwards, Knight, Broome, and
Flynn (2010). Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) is at the group level of the
carrier and it denotes the quality of leadership provided by supervisory flight managers
such as Chief / Assistant Chief Pilots. Previous work by Adjekum (2017) indicated
Cronbach alpha coefficients above .84. A typical TSL item (responses were limited to a
5-point Likert scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5—reverse coding was
handled in the data analysis phase): Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership do not listen to
my concerns.
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Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy – measured by 4 items from the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale
developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) to assess pilot perception regarding their
ability to deal with non-normal situations. Previous studies reported a Cronbach’s alpha
of .86 for this instrument. A typical item in the SE group (responses were limited to a 5point Likert scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5): I am confident that I
could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Safety Motivation
Safety motivation - used 3 items to measure the degree to which respondents
regard safety as an essential part of their professional development, developed from the
work of Neal and Griffin (2006). The reported Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .90. A
typical item in the SM group (responses were limited to a 5-point Likert scale, Strongly
Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5): It’s important to maintain safety at all times.
Safety Behavior
Safety behavior (safety compliance and safety participation) - safety behavior
consisted of a total of 6 items divided into two components (i.e., safety compliance and
safety participation), developed from work by Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) and Neal
and Griffin (2006). Safety compliance evaluated the core tasks that pilots have to
accomplish to maintain flight safety using 3 items. Safety participation assessed the
extent to which pilots help develop an environment that supports safety using 3 items.
The reported alpha coefficients for safety compliance and safety participation were .91
and .84, respectively.
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A typical item in the safety participation portion of the safety behavior construct
(responses were limited to a 5-point Likert scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly
Agree = 5): I promote the safety program within the organization.
A typical item in the safety compliance portion of the safety behavior construct
(responses were limited to a 5-point Likert scale, Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly
Agree = 5): I follow correct safety procedures when operating.
Safety Related Events
Safety-related events – adopted from Adjekum’s (2014a) Collegiate Aviation
Perception of Safety Culture Assessment Scale or CAPSCAS instrument. These 4 items
were used to evaluate the relationship between a respondent’s knowledge regarding
company safety-related events and their safety behavior. The reported reliability of this
instrument was .92. The SRE scale was coded on a 5-point Likert scale to capture the
frequency of occurrence of events (1 = extremely rare to 5 = very frequent): Across the
operation every month, how often do company flights encounter proximity to another
aircraft requiring evasive action?
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Demographic Information
The survey was made available to the 10,500 flight operations personnel at the
carrier via general newsletter announcements. No incentives were paid to participants.
The carrier reported a 50% read rate for the weekly newsletter in which the link to the
survey was provided. Thus, the effective response rate was 5.4%. Though historically
one might prefer a higher response rate, upwards of 80% is the expected norm for
federally funded studies (Hendra and Hill, 2015), both Hendra and Hill (2015) and
Rindfuss et al. (2015) reported no evidence of an increased level of non-response bias
from a lower number of responses.
The online survey closed after a six-week response period. Tables 1, 2, and 3
contain the respondent demographic data. Two hundred fifty-six (n = 256) complete
cases proceeded beyond the consent phase. Thirty cases (n = 30) were excluded from the
analysis due to lack of consent or the data was incomplete for analysis. Respondents
represented various roles within Flight Operations. Ninety–seven (n = 97) Check
Airmen, seventy-eight (n = 78) Captains, fifty-four (n = 54) First Officers, four (n = 4)
Instructors, and twenty-three (n = 23) “Other” responses were recorded. Respondents in
the “Other” category included various staff and management pilots, and other staff
analysts and safety professionals.
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Table 1
Demographic Variables Age and Gender

N

Percentage

>25 - 30 Years

6

2.3%

>30 - 35 Years

1

0.4%

>35 - 40 Years

18

7.0%

>40 - 45 Years

18

7.0%

>45 - 50 Years

16

6.3%

>50 - 55 Years

86

33.6%

>55 - 60 Years

64

25.0%

> 60 Years

47

18.4%

Total

256

100%

Female

22

8.6%

Male

232

90.6%

2

0.8%

256

100%

Age

Gender

No Report
Total
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Respondents were asked to report their years of experience at the company by
selecting one five-year category. Thirty (n = 30) reported less than one year to five years,
twenty-five (n = 25) reported greater than five to ten years, thirty (n = 30) reported
greater than ten to fifteen years, fifty-nine (n = 59) reported greater than fifteen to twenty
years, sixty-five (n = 65) reported greater than twenty to twenty-five years, forty-one (n =
41) greater than twenty-five to thirty years, and six (n = 6) greater than thirty years.
Table 2
Demographic Variables Role and First Experience with SMS
N

Percentage

Check Airman

97

37.9%

Captain

78

30.5%

First Officer

54

21.1%

Instructor

4

1.6%

Other

23

9.0%

Total

256

100%

True

192

75%

False

64

25%

Total

256

100%

Role at the Company

First Experience with
SMS at the Company?
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Table 3
Demographic Variable Years at Company

N

Percentage

0 - 5 Years

30

11.7%

>5 - 10 Years

25

9.8%

>10 - 15 Years

30

11.7%

>15 - 20 Years

59

23.0%

>20 - 25 Years

65

25.4%

>25 - 30 Years

41

16.0%

>30 Years

6

2.3%

256

100%

Years at the Company

Total

Approximately 9% of the respondents to the survey were female (n = 22), 91%
were male (n = 232) and 1% did not report (n = 2). The skew in the gender statistic is not
surprising, as only 4.7% of the pilots who held an Airline Transport Pilot license in 2021
were female (FAA, 2022). The response rate for females to the survey exceeds the
carrier’s overall number of female pilots (which is close to 4%).
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Quantitative Data Analysis and Validation
The quantitative data for this research effort was gathered using the Qualtrics®
XM survey package. IBM SPSS Statistics 27® and IBM SPSS Amos 27® software
packages were used to perform an analysis of the data from the survey. All analyses
were done with an a priori statistical significance of 0.05 (two-tailed) unless otherwise
specified. Because this work was based upon existing, validated measures and a robust
model (Adjekum, 2017), a first-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used to
assess the strength of relationships between constructs and their underlying scale items.
A first-order CFA allows the researcher to determine whether scale items in the
measurement model, like SMS (SMSPol and SMSPro) and self-efficacy (SE) performed
satisfactorily and in line with the researcher’s knowledge of the constructs in the existing
theory. CFA was also utilized to assess whether the research data fit hypothesized
measurement models of the constructs in the study. The Composite Reliability (CR)
method was used to analyze the reliability or repeatability of the scale, using Field’s
(2018) recommendation of a value of 0.70 or higher. Figure 10 contains a visual
depiction of the final measurement model, including regression weights. Table 4
contains goodness-of-fit indices for the various models considered and the modifications
made on each iteration.
As part of the CFA process, convergent validity was assessed using the Average
Variance Extracted (AVE) method. The criterion for determining convergent validity
was an AVE above 0.50 for each construct as proposed by Fornell and Larcker (2018).
To assess discriminant validity, the square root of each AVE was compared with the
correlation coefficients for each construct. A correlation coefficient of less than the
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square root of the AVE suggests discriminant validity if the inter-correlations among a
set of variables presumed to measure different constructs are not high (Kline, 2016).
A first-order CFA was performed on each of the constructs explored in this study
using a measurement model encapsulating the following seven constructs: SMS policy
implementation (SMSPol), SMS process engagement (SMSPro), transformational safety
leadership (TSL), self-efficacy (SE), safety compliance (SC), safety participation (SP),
and safety motivation (SM). IBM SPSS AMOS 27 Graphics® was used to carry out the
analysis to determine the goodness of fit indices, factor loading, and other relevant
inferential outputs.
Competing measurement models were assessed, and sequential iterations based on
theoretical guidance and the modification indices from the AMOS software were used to
select the measurement model with the best fit for the observed data. Each assessment
iteration resulted in post hoc modifications to the model, generally due to low factor
loadings. Low factor loadings led to the exclusion of items from the following
constructs: safety compliance (SC), safety participation (SP), safety motivation (SM),
SMS policy implementation (SMSPol), SMS process engagement (SMSPro), selfefficacy (SE) and safety motivation (SM). Specifically, SMSPOL2, SMSPOL5,
SMSPRO3, SE3, SE4, SC1, SP1, and SM1 were excluded from the final measurement
model. Additionally, consideration was given to instrument performance by construct in
the final measurement model (an attempt was made to retain at least three items per
construct for better reliability). In the final iteration, the covariances were added between
errors as suggested by the AMOS modification indices, leading to the final measurement
model.
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Figure 10
Final Measurement Model
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Descriptive statistics including mean, median, standard deviation, and standard
error of the mean were assessed and normality (kurtosis and skewness) was checked for
the emergent data set. Additionally, a visual inspection of the data versus the normal
distribution curve was conducted. All subject variables indicated nominal performance,
except safety motivation (SM) and safety compliance (SC). Safety motivation (SM) was
negatively skewed at -2.99 and exhibited a kurtosis of 9.99. Safety compliance (SC)
exhibited negative skewness of -1.86 and a kurtosis of 7.65.

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities of Study Variables (I).

SMSPol

SMSPro

SE

SM

256

256

256

256

Mean

4.1904

4.2296

4.2910

4.8414

Std. Error of Mean

.04796

.03038

.03903

.02237

Median

4.3300

4.1700

4.5000

5.0000

Std. Deviation

.76740

.48607

.62448

.35788

Skewness

-.912

-.339

-.905

-2.990

Std. Error of Skewness

.152

.152

.152

.152

Kurtosis

-.096

-.706

.008

9.993

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.303

.303

.303

.303

Composite Reliability

0.95

0.86

0.80

0.88

4

5

2

2

N

# Items in Scale
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The negative skewness and leptokurtic nature of both distributions are not
surprising given the scale used for the constructs (one to five, five being the most positive
selection). However, due to the adequate sample size, it was assumed that any potential
issues with normality will be mitigated.
In terms of scale consistency and reliability, all the constructs assessed had
composite reliability above the 0.70 thresholds, consistent with findings from previous
studies. Tables 4 and 5 contain the information on the descriptive statistics and
composite reliability for all scales used in the study.
Convergent validity was assessed using the AVE method (Fornell & Larcker,
1981). This method allows the assessment of the amount of variance captured by the
construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The AVE values for all scales were above the 0.50
threshold, except SMS Process Engagement (SMSPro) at 0.49. Convergent validity
could not be ascertained for SMSPro based on the data using the Fornell-Larcker
approach. However, based on theoretical foundations, one can still include items that
narrowly fail to meet a priori criteria (Bollen and Lennox, 1991). Thus, due to the high
composite reliability of the scale for the construct demonstrated in the study (CR = .86),
further analysis will be done using SMSPro in the analysis.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliabilities of Study Variables (II).

SC

SP

TSL

SRE

256

256

256

256

Mean

4.4691

4.3881

4.2595

2.8131

Std. Error of Mean

.03713

.03713

.04047

.02628

Median

4.6700

4.3300

4.3300

2.8100

Std. Deviation

.59413

.59411

.64758

.42047

Skewness

-1.869

-1.009

-.584

.376

Std. Error of Skewness

.152

.152

.152

.152

Kurtosis

7.651

2.838

-.842

.595

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.303

.303

.303

.303

Composite Reliability

0.95

0.84

0.98

0.88

2

2

6

4

N

# Items in Scale

Discriminant validity (or the degree to which items within a construct only
measure the construct in question and no other construct) was assessed by comparing the
square root of each AVE with the correlation coefficients for each construct (Kline,
2016). Using this method, so long as the correlation coefficient is less than the square
root of the AVE, discriminant validity is believed to exist (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
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Given the results of the analysis, discriminant validity can be assumed. Table 7 contains
the AVE and correlation values used in the analysis.
Table 7
The square root of AVE (diagonal) and correlation between constructs (off-diagonal).

AVE

SMSPol

SMSPro

SE

TSL

SM

SC

SMSPol

0.59

0.767

SMSPro

0.49

0.421

0.523

SE

0.66

0.604

0.801

0.809

TSL

0.52

0.506

0.689

0.751

0.718

SM

0.64

0.352

0.337

0.459

0.461

0.799

SC

0.90

0.186

0.169

0.252

0.261

0.508

0.949

SP

0.73

0.319

0.102

0.312

0.341

0.473

0.785

SP

0.857

Question One
What is the effectiveness of a final measurement model that assesses the
relationships between SMS process engagement, SMS policy implementation,
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the outcome variable safety
behavior measured by safety compliance and safety participation, when mediated by
safety motivation at a commercial air carrier?
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A Structural Equation Model (SEM)/Path Analysis (PA) approach was used to
determine the strength of relationships between study variables, including the fit indices
of all competing structural models and the model with the best fit selected. Multiple
measures for goodness-of-fit indices were reported as part of the model effectiveness:
Chi-square (χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Normed Fit
Index (NFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Incremental Fit
Index (IFI).
The chi-square (χ2) is a classic goodness-of-fit measure used to assess overall
model fit. A potential shortcoming of chi-squared is its sensitivity to sample size (i.e., it
becomes more difficult to retain the null hypothesis as the number of cases increases
(Kline, 2016)).

Chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the predicted model and

observed data are equal.
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) evaluates the fit of a user-specified solution
concerning a more restricted model in which the covariance among all input indicators is
fixed to zero, or no relationship among variables (Brown, 2006, p.86). CFI ranges from 0
(poor fit) to 1 (good fit).
The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) is a non-normed fit index, and like the CFI a value
of 0.95 or above is considered a good fit. TLI can have values outside of the range of 0.0
– 1.0, but the ideal value approaches 1.0 (Brown, 2006). The Normed Fit Index (NFI) and
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) should be above 0.90, otherwise, the model may need
improvement (Kline, 2016).
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is another commonly
reported statistic used in SEM. A value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model
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about the degrees of freedom, while greater than 0.10 could indicate a problem (Kline,
2016). RMSEA is not as sensitive to sample size as is chi-square but can be sensitive to
model complexity (Brown, 2006).
An assessment was performed on the first competing hypothesized measurement
model (fully mediated) that captured the relationship between the variables (Model I).
The fully mediated measurement model did not produce acceptable goodness-of-fit
indices. See Appendix E for the fully mediated initial measurement model. Using
theoretical guidance and recommendation from the AMOS modification indices (MI)
function, covariances were added between the error terms of the endogenous variables to
produce another competing model with a relatively improved model fit (Model II, shown
in Appendix F).
Additional iterations were done to improve Model II by removing various
combinations of variables (namely TSL-->SC, SMSPro --> SP; SE --> SP). Various fit
indices measures fluctuated, and another competing model with better fit indices was
recommended by MI and explored. The final best-fit indices were obtained on Model V.
The direct path between SMSPro and SP was removed, and a covariance term was added
between error terms e6/e7.
The resulting competing model (Model V as shown in Figure 11) was adopted as
the final structural model with the best indices across all measures: χ2 (1, 256) = 0.152,
CMIN/DF = .003, p = .956, NFI = 1.000, IFI = 1.002, TLI = 1.038 , CFI = .999, and
RMSEA = .000 (.000 - .000). Table 8 shows the goodness-of-fit indices for the
competing models. Table 9 depicts estimates of the Relationships Between SMSPol,
SMSPro, TSL, SE, SM, SC, and SP in the final model.
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Additionally, Table 9 addresses the estimates for the constructs in the model,
including maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), standard error (SE), critical ratios (CR),
p-values, estimated effect sizes, and hypothesis of the final measurement model with the
best goodness-of-fit.
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Figure 11
Model V - final structural model with best-fit indices.
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Figure 12
Final structural model with standardized regression weights.
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Hypothesis Testing
The study was designed to evaluate the strengths of relationships between of
SMSPol (SMS policy implementation) and SMSPro (SMS process engagement) on safety
behaviors as measured by SC (safety compliance) and SP (safety participation).
Additionally, the mediating role of SM (safety motivation) on the relationships between
SMS components, TSL (transformational safety leadership), and SE (self-efficacy), and
the variables measuring safety behaviors (SC and SP) were assessed. The results of the
interactions between the constructs based on the final measurement model adopted were
used to validate the 23 hypotheses initially postulated. Standardized R-squared
coefficients were reported in the results to quantify the effect of the exogenous variables
on the endogenous variables.
Hypothesis 1. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to their safety motivation. The results indicated that the strength
of the relationship between SMSPro and SM was not statistically significant (p = 0.361).
The null hypothesis is retained in favor of the alternative which is not supported.
Hypothesis 2. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to safety compliance. The results indicated that a weak
relationship between SMSPro and SC was statistically significant (β = -0.120, S.E. =
0.070, C.R. = -2.103, p < .05). The null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternate
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to safety participation. The final structural model did not include
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a direct link between SMSPro and SP. Thus, the hypothesis could not be validated in the
study population.
Hypothesis 4. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement and safety compliance. The
results indicated that the relatively weak direct relationship between SMSPro and SC was
statistically significant (β = -0.120, S.E. = 0.070, C.R. = -2.103, p < .05). The direct
effect of SMSPro on SC was -.120, the indirect (mediated) effect was .024, for a total
effect of -.097. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected.
Hypothesis 5. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement and safety participation. The
results indicated that there is no direct link between SMSPro and SP in the model. The
hypothesis therefore could not be validated.
Hypothesis 6. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety motivation. The relationship between SMSPol
and SM failed to achieve significance in the study (p = 0.652). Thus, the null hypothesis
was retained.
Hypothesis 7. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to safety compliance. The study revealed a relatively weak
relationship between SMSPol and SC (β = 0.136, S.E. = 0.050, C.R. = 2.097, p < .05).
The direct effect of .136 and the indirect effect of .012 reflected a total effect of .147.
Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8. Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to safety participation. The study revealed a relatively weak
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relationship between SMSPol and SP (β = 0.115, S.E. = 1.047, C.R. = 1.095, p < .05).
The direct effect of .115 and the indirect effect of .010 reflected a total effect of .125.
Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 9. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and safety compliance.
The study results achieved significance regarding a moderate effect of SM on SC (β =
0.376, S.E. = 0.100, C.R. = 6.260, p < .001). The direct or unmediated effect was .136,
the indirect (mediated) effect was .012 for a total effect of .147. Thus, the null hypothesis
was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 10. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and safety participation.
The study results achieved significance regarding an unmediated moderate effect of SM
on SP (β = 0.341, S.E. = 0.094, C.R. = 5.988, p < .001). The direct or unmediated effect
was .115, and the indirect (mediated) effect was .010 for a total effect of .125. Thus, it
was appropriate to reject the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 11. The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to the safety motivation of respondents. The study results
achieved significance regarding an unmediated weak effect of TSL on SM (β = 0.150,
S.E. = 0.043, C.R. = 1.928, p < .05). Thus, it was appropriate to reject the null
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 12. The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to safety compliance. The relationship between TSL and SC
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failed to achieve significance in the study (p = 0.706). Thus, the null hypothesis was
retained.
Hypothesis 13. The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to safety participation. The study revealed a relatively weak
relationship between TSL and SP (β = 0.232, S.E. = 0.057, C.R. = 3.723, p < .001). The
direct effect of .232 and the indirect effect of .051 reflected a total effect of .283. Thus, it
was appropriate to reject the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 14. The safety motivation of respondents mediated the relationship
between their perceptions of transformational safety leadership and safety compliance.
The study results suggested no significant relationship between TSL, and SC when
mediated by SM (β = -0.028, S.E. = 0.067, C.R. = -0.378, p = 0.706). The direct effect of
-.028 and indirect effect of .056 reflected a total effect of .029. Due to the failure to
achieve the a priori significance level, the null hypothesis was retained.
Hypothesis 15. The safety motivation of respondents mediates the relationship
between their perceptions of transformational safety leadership and safety participation.
The study results achieved significance between TSL, and SP mediated by SM (β =
0.232, S.E. = 0.057, C.R. = 3.723, p < 0.001). The direct effect of .232 and the indirect
effect of .051 reflected a total effect of .283. Thus, it was appropriate to reject the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 16. Respondents perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety
motivation. The study revealed a relatively weak relationship between SE and SM (β =
0.244, S.E. = 0.045, C.R. = 3.134, p < .05). The direct effect was .244 with no observed
indirect effect. Thus, it was appropriate to reject the null hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 17. Respondents perceived self-efficacy is related to safety
compliance. The study results achieved significance for the weak direct effect between
SE and SC (β = 0.157, S.E. = 0.063, C.R. = 2.372, p < .05). Thus, it was appropriate to
reject the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 18. Respondents perceived self-efficacy is related to safety
participation. The analysis resulted in a non-significant direct link between SE and SP,
thus the null hypothesis is retained.
Hypothesis 19. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their self-efficacy and safety compliance. The study results achieved
significance for the weak effect between SE and SC (β = 0.157, S.E. = 0.063, C.R. =
2.372, p < .05). The direct effect was .157 and the indirect (mediated) effect between SE
and SC was .092, for a total effect of .249. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected.
Hypothesis 20. Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their self-efficacy and safety participation. The study results
contained a non-significant direct path between SE and SP (mediated by SM). Thus, the
null hypothesis is retained.
Question Two
What are the strengths of the relationship between safety behavior (as measured
by safety compliance and safety participation) and safety-related events?
Hypothesis 21. Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation.
The study results indicated a strong relationship between SC and SP (β = 0.590, S.E. =
0.053, C.R. = 11.216, p < .001). Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected.

103

Hypothesis 22. Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation
when mediated by an awareness of safety-related events. The study results indicated a
moderate relationship between SC and SP mediated by SRE (β = 0.310, S.E. = 0.052,
C.R. = 4.232, p < .001). The direct effect of SC and SP, when moderated by SRE, was
.310, and the indirect (mediated effect) was .001, for a total effect of .311. Thus, it was
appropriate to reject the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 23. Respondent safety compliance is related to safety-related events.
The study results did not indicate a significant direct effect between SC and SRE (p =
0.781). Thus, it was appropriate to retain the null hypothesis.
Table 10 shows the details of the Path Analysis estimates for the relationships
between SC, SP, and SRE. Figure 13 also shows the Path Analysis diagram of the
relationships. Table 11 provides a summary of all the hypotheses tested and their final
validation outcomes.
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Table 11
A summary of the results of the hypotheses tested.

Hypothesis

Results

H1: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to their safety motivation.

Not
Supported

H2: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to safety compliance.

Supported

H3: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process
engagement are related to safety participation.

Not
Supported

H4 Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement and
safety compliance.

Supported

H5: Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS process engagement and
safety participation.

Not
Supported

H6: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety motivation.

Not
Supported

H7: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to safety compliance.

Supported

H8: Respondents’ perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy
implementation are related to safety participation.

Supported

H9: Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and
safety compliance.

Supported

H10: Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their carrier’s SMS policy implementation and
safety participation.

Supported

H11: The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to the safety motivation of respondents.

Supported
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Table 11 continued

Hypothesis

Results

H12: The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to respondent safety compliance.

Not
Supported

H13: The transformational safety leadership styles of top-level
management are related to respondent safety participation.

Supported

H14: Safety motivation of respondents mediates the relationship
between their perceptions of transformational safety leadership and
safety compliance.

Not
Supported

H15: Safety motivation of respondents mediates the relationship
between their perceptions of transformational safety leadership and
safety participation.

Supported

H16: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety
motivation.

Supported

H17: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to safety
compliance.

Supported

H18: Respondent perceived self-efficacy is related to safety
participation.

Not
Supported

H19: Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their self-efficacy and safety compliance.

Supported

H20: Respondent safety motivation mediates the relationship between
their perceptions of their self-efficacy and safety participation.

Not
Supported

H21: Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation.

Supported

H22: Respondent safety compliance is related to safety participation
when mediated by an awareness of safety-related events.

Not
Supported

H23: Respondent safety compliance is related to their perception of
safety-related events.

Not
Supported
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Question Three
What are the differences in perception among the demographic variables (years
at the carrier, age group, flight certification level (first officer, captain, check-airman),
SMS training status, and gender) on safety compliance and safety-related events?
A one-way between-S ANOVA was utilized to compare the mean scores on the
respondent perception of safety compliance (SC) and safety-related events (SRE) by
years at the carrier. Visual examination of the data for outliers, as well as inspection of
the histograms, confirmed a normal distribution for the SC and SRE data.
As part of the analysis, a Levene test was conducted to detect serious violations of
homogeneity of variance assumptions across years at the company groups with respect to
SC. No significant violations were found, F (6, 256) = 1.49, p = .182. The overall F
value for the one-way ANOVA was statistically significant, F (6, 256) = 2.44, p = .026.
A Bonferroni-Tukey post hoc test revealed significant differences between the mean
scores on SC of the >20 – 25 Years at the company group (M = 4.31, SD = .653) and the
>25 – 30 Years at the company group (M = 4.72, SD = .425), suggesting that the latter
had more favorable perceptions on SC items.
An examination of safety-related events (SRE) and years at the carrier revealed no
significant differences, F (6, 256) = 2.11, p = .052.
Though there was a significant difference noted in SC scores and years at the
company, there were no significant differences in SC and age, F (6, 256) = 1.41, p =
.202, nor SRE and age, F (6, 256) = 1.03, p = .410. The significant difference in SC by
tenure, with the most tenured folks showing the highest level of SC, may indicate that
these personnel have internalized the safety culture of the carrier and they exhibit it in the
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operation, or they may have become the most tenured in the group because they exhibit
the qualities demonstrated as part of the SC construct.
There were no significant differences detected between the pilot workgroups and
safety compliance, F (4, 256) = 1.76, p = .138. Regarding workgroup and safety-related
events, a significant difference was detected between groups, F (4, 256) = 3.03, p = .012.
A Bonferroni-Tukey post hoc test revealed significant differences between the mean
scores of First Officers (M = 2.67, SD = .363) and Check Airmen (M = 2.91, SD = .384).
The First Officers perceived a lower occurrence of safety-related events than the Check
Airmen.
SC and gender were examined using an independent t-test of means. Statistically
significant results were found during the Levene Test, F (2, 252) = 14.96, p < .001.
Thus, homogeneity of variance or equal variances could not be assumed. The t-test
indicated significant results between SC and gender, t (51.50) = 5.61, p < .001. Female
pilot perception of safety compliance (M = 4.80, SD = .243) was significantly higher than
that of male pilot perception regarding safety compliance (M = 4.44, SD = .609). The
Cohen’s d estimate was .626, indicating a medium effect size.
An analysis of SRE and gender using an independent t-test of means revealed
statistically significant results during the Levene Test, F (2, 252) = 9.76, p = .002. Thus,
homogeneity of variance or equal variances could not be assumed. As mentioned earlier,
the scale for SRE was: Extremely Rare (1); Rare (2); Occasional (3); Frequent (4); Very
Frequent (5). The t-test indicated significant results between SRE and gender, t (52.54) =
3.85, p < .001. Female pilots perceived a higher rate of safety-related events (M = 2.98,
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SD = .171) than male pilots (M = 2.80, SD = .434). The Cohen’s d (effect size) was .426,
indicating a weak to moderate effect.
The final analysis examined the differences in respondents’ perceptions of safety
compliance, safety participation, and safety-related events based on their initial exposure
to SMS training. No significant differences were noted between SC and first exposure to
SMS, t (254) = .804, p = .422.
However, a significant difference was noted between SRE and first exposure to
SMS, t (254) = 3.37, p < .001. Results suggest that pilots whose first exposure to SMS
was at the carrier (M = 2.86, SD = .428) perceived higher rates of SRE than those who
had experienced SMS training for the first time elsewhere (M = 2.66, SD = .359). The
Cohen’s d (effect size) was .486, indicating a weak to moderate effect. Finally, no
significant differences were noted between safety participation (SP) and those who
experienced SMS at a place other than the carrier than those whose first experience was
at the carrier, t (254) = .124, p < .901.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Qualitative Data Analysis and Validation
The qualitative data portion of the study was designed to gather the opinions and
recommendations of middle management and senior leaders regarding the
implementation and execution of SMS at the carrier. All interviews were conducted
remotely using Microsoft Teams® software. This video conferencing suite contained
audio, video, and transcription capabilities that were appropriate for the research.
Initial quality assurance tests confirming the accuracy of the transcription function
within the Teams® software were completed before formal interviews began. A small
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number of random scripts were read in an environment representative of the interview
conditions, and audio (MP3) recordings and transcripts were automatically produced.
The transcripts were then manually checked for errors. Once it was determined the
Microsoft Teams package was fit for the task, the interview portion of the study began.
Per the design of the study, interviews were recorded via MP3 files while being
simultaneously transcribed by the Teams® software. After completion of the interview,
the transcript was examined for any obvious errors, and if there was a need for
clarification, the MP3 file was accessed. The cleaned-up transcript of each session was
then sent to the respondent for their review before inclusion in the analysis. Respondents
were given the opportunity to ask the researcher to remove or modify content for errors,
inadvertent misstatements, or poorly transcribed items. After the respondent review was
complete, the data was integrated into the larger package of de-identified data.
The data from the transcripts was imported into NVivo 12® for further analysis.
NVivo 12® is a capable software package that facilitates the coding and theming of
information gathered from a wide variety of sources. The package also allows a
researcher to develop a visual or schematic presentation of the data, such as the use of
word clouds, thematic trees, etc.
The transcripts were coded using an in-vivo approach (using the words of the
respondents) and descriptive coding (summarizing the respondent’s words into a short
phrase) as discussed by Saldaña and Omasta (2018). A deductive framework that was
guided a priori using themes found in previous research was utilized (Adjekum, 2014b;
2017; Adjekum & Tous, 2020). The themes which emerged were generally in line with
previous studies, but additional information applicable to Part 121 carriers was extracted,
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as well. Additionally, field notes and analytic memos were used in conjunction with the
interview transcripts to round out the data gathered (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018). Some
direct quotes were added to the discussion to reinforce the points made by the
participants. The major themes of the qualitative portion of the study included: the role
of leadership, benefits of SMS implementation, challenges of SMS implementation,
recommendations to other carriers, and measures of SMS.
Figure 14
Conceptual tree of study codes and themes.

Role of Leadership
As was accomplished in Adjekum and Jensen’s 2016 work, the following
question was asked: “What role does leadership play in the safety policy implementation
of the SMS program?” The question was designed to evaluate the perceptions of senior
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leaders regarding the potential connection between transformational safety leadership and
the successful implementation of an SMS. Four distinct themes emerged from the
responses (covered below). The respondents were unanimous in their belief that strong
leadership is a necessary ingredient for the successful implementation and maintenance
of an SMS.
Leader sets the tone. Multiple respondents clearly reported the leader sets the
tone for the safety culture of the organization. The leader also gives priority, energy, and
is the driving force for the implementation and execution of an SMS. Though there is an
important element of SMS that originates from the shop floor, respondents repeatedly
stated that active leadership is key to the successful implementation of SMS:
Leader A reinforced the leadership view:
“I think leadership plays a pretty important role in the overall implementation of
SMS and just setting the clear expectations of all of the people, whether it's
management or frontline, giving them an expectation of what we're working
towards.”
Leader B added clarification—the leader must believe in the effort:
“Well, I mean, at least from where I sit, understanding that you're supported in
this effort by senior leadership and that it is something not just directed, but that
we actually believe in the benefits of it. Buy-in can be facilitated from the top
down.”
Clear responsibility. Respondents also reiterated that leadership must have clear
responsibility (via the Accountable Executive). The organization must empower the
Accountable Executive with the resources, people, and authority to execute an SMS:
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Leader A reinforced the connection between SMS and safety performance:
“Leadership is ultimately responsible for safety performance, so I don't think
that's too revolutionary. But just like leadership is responsible for financial
performance, operational performance, it's yet one more dimension that
leadership has always been responsible for, but SMS just clearly defines it and
gives us some good fundamental tools to actually accomplish that.”
Leader B captured the need for clear accountability from the top:
“I think overall that SMS is driven from the top, and without that energy, I don't
think you really have anything to stand on.”
Respondents reinforced the expectation of clear lines of responsibility in multiple
answers. Additionally, participants discussed the potential issues that might arise when
clear responsibility was lacking.
Strong accountable executive. One of the notable aspects of the construction
and implementation of an SMS is the concept of the Accountable Executive. Even in a
consensus-driven organization (like the carrier in this study), leaders saw the need for a
capable and empowered Accountable Executive:
Leader A reinforced the need for the role:
“I think the Accountable Executive plays a significant role. The Accountable
Executive signs the safety policy (safety commitment) and leaders have to provide
the resources (really the money) to pull off an SMS. So, with that, you do have
every single layer of our leadership from the very top all the way down to your
frontline leaders really engaged in the safety policy part of SMS.”
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Lead through the implementation. Respondents addressed both the pre-SMS
period at the carrier and the current day policy requiring SMS at U.S. 14 CFR Part 121
companies. The importance of a clear leader helping the carrier navigate both the preSMS implementation setting and the post-implementation environment was addressed by
multiple participants.
Benefits of SMS Implementation
The following question was asked: “What are some of the benefits of the
implementation of SMS at the carrier?” This question was designed to initiate a
discussion on the positive aspects of SMS implementation and execution at the carrier.
Responses ran a wide gamut from the reduction of risk and cost to better documentation
of processes to provide for a safer operation. A number of the themes are discussed
below.
Risk reduction. Multiple respondents cited various aspects of risk reduction as a
major benefit of SMS implementation. Though a carrier may have a very robust safety
culture, without the prescriptive framework of SMS, there are many opportunities or gaps
through which errors or safety miscues might make it through.
Leader A connected risk reduction and the leadership “heart” of the company:
“So first and foremost, I think we have reduced risk in the organization and
reduced risk is a reduction in injuries and reduction in damage and both of those
have a cost element. But more importantly on the injury side, it just improves the
relationship between the company and our employees. If our people genuinely
feel that we're looking out for their best interest, employees perceive that as our
‘heart’. At best, ‘heart’ is a hard thing to measure in terms of dollars, but I think
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you'd find that it's just better for their management/employee relationship
overall.”
Leader B relayed the need for a clear link between hazards and mitigations:
“You know, I feel confident in what we are doing, especially with regards to
identifying what the hazards are. By identifying those ineffective risk controls, I
can feel comfortable where I need to focus my resources because it's actionable
based on what's been provided.”
Cost reduction. Not only did the respondents point out risk reduction as a
benefit of SMS, but they also mention cost reduction, as well. Whether through reduced
injuries, less damage to equipment, or the implementation of efficiencies, cost reduction
goes runs parallel with risk reduction when implementing and executing an SMS.
Leader A relayed any cost of SMS implementation will be offset by the operation:
“And then there's the hard dollars, damages, and injuries cost money. So, it
behooves us to manage those things from a few financial standpoints, but also it
better connects our leadership with our employees by showing that we’re looking
out for their best interests.”
Predictive versus reactive. Over half of the respondents mentioned aspects of
the proactive nature of SMS as a benefit to the company. Unlike the traditional Safety I
program (which tends to wait for an outcome and then dissect it), SMS enables the
organization to identify risks and mitigate them, thus being proactive.
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Leader A supported the notion that SMS allows the carrier to be proactive:
“I think the probably the biggest benefit is basically changing from a reactive
method to a proactive method. We used to have a lot of data (and we still have a
lot of data) that we look at and we would allow the data to kind of guide us in a
direction based on whatever it was for that month. Now proactively we can say
these are the things that we're wanting to look at because these are what impact
risk in our operation, and these are the things we must manage. And so, we can
actually go out and specifically collect the data around those specific things,
rather than just wait for an event to happen.”
Leader B succinctly addressed the benefits of SMS given the lack of negative
outcomes:
“We don't have a lot of outcomes. We don't have a lot of big significant incidents
(thankfully), and so we as an industry over the last 20 years or so have had to
transition into thinking about risk--and that's really important. As you know from
the leadership perspective because what we’re about now is avoiding the
outcome, and so we have to think about probability and severity. We have to base
our decision-making based on risk.”
Leader C spoke to hazards and proactive implementation of mitigations:
“Evaluating everything and saying OK, what kind of pops to the top? The goal
now is to identify those things before they turn into incidents, accidents, injuries,
and what have you.”
Documentation. A number of the participants in the interviews pointed out an
aspect of the implementation of SMS that provided an unforeseen benefit—
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documentation. Respondents described a time at the carrier in the recent past when a
change was considered, but not implemented, and there was little to no documentation to
capture the work accomplished in the evaluation. Under SMS, and the use of several
governance tools at this carrier, documentation is much more thorough post SMS
implementation, allowing employees to go back and see the “why” behind decisions
involving operational risk.
Leader A lauded the greater “lookback” capability under SMS:
“We never kept notes on the things we didn’t want before, right? So, you're going
to throw away the paperwork on the stuff that you did not want, then five years
later (when you go back to the same decision), you will wish you kept the work.
Unlike that scenario, SMS does keep everything. It keeps all the decisions that
we've made and details of the process. Unlike the scenario I mentioned, we have
the details on the ones we agreed upon, and ones that we disagreed about, too.
So, when we go back three or five years later, and we have the same airplane with
the same issues, we can see why we made decisions and why we may be where we
are.”
Leader B highlighted the benefits of better record keeping under SMS:
“And there’s the documentation piece. In Flight Ops we maintain operational risk
records on mitigations and assurance, not just for today, but things we can go
back and look at later. As to explaining the ‘why’ behind actions, this info is
critical. It provides for continuity, and it provides also in the case you need to
explain something down the road.”
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Challenges of SMS Implementation
The following question was asked: “ What are some of the challenges in the
execution of SMS at the carrier?” This question was designed to initiate a discussion on
the ongoing issues with SMS execution at the company. This item opened the door to a
wide discussion of challenges seen in larger organizations: communication, coordination,
and mission creep. Additionally, leaders reiterated the importance of being properly
resourced (this group overwhelmingly reported they were properly resourced), and the
value of trying to not over-complicate one’s SMS.
Departmental coordination. Multiple respondents addressed the issue of
challenges between departments regarding SMS implementation and execution.
Different unions and the mix of contract and non-contract workgroups exacerbate the
issue. Additionally, the failure of the regulator to direct Just Cause/Just Culture
implementation along with SMS allowed various walls to be reinforced, rather than
sharing all safety data without concern between departments (and potentially the
regulator). Though the carrier in this study has a robust set of safety programs, there still
exist challenges in exchanging information in a wider forum to facilitate learning (outside
of ASAP).
Leader A related the work required to facilitate cross-departmental coordination:
“Some of our biggest challenges, honestly have been getting all the departments
to play together--realizing that a change that you make in your department
impacts others. Now, whether it's in Ground Ops or Inflight or Flight Ops—an
implementation could have an adverse impact on a safety concern in a different
department. We have to ask: ‘how do we go about it?”
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Leader B expressed concern regarding potential deelays during implementation:
“You're probably not as efficient in your implementation as you'd like to be, so it's
viewed as a bureaucratic type of tool here (i.e., something we have to do). Many
will question why do we have to document or write down something for just a
small change? Additionally, all of this coordination can result in delays when
departments struggle to make sure their systems ‘talk to each other’.”
Resources. Many respondents highlighted the resources needed to both set up the
SMS (during the implementation phase) and execute an SMS (during normal operations).
Most of the respondents indicated it takes a lot of time and skilled personnel to
implement and administer an SMS—the number might be larger than what the team
thought they might need at the outset. All reported satisfaction regarding the level of
personnel and material resources dedicated to the SM effort at the carrier.
Leader A relayed the need to resource the effort:
“Again, there's a resourcing section where, hey, we just put this policy in place.
We're gonna train it. We're going to resource it. We're going to make sure that
our employees have the tools to go out and execute. And all that builds into what
we determine is acceptable and not acceptable from a safety standpoint.”
Leader B discussed some of the nuances of the resources during implementation:
“Additionally, we have to resource those items, to ensure everybody is up to
speed to learn the methodologies of how this applies to my day in and day out
duties. And you’ll need resources for continuing training.”
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Leader C bluntly captured it takes resources to keep an SMS going:
“It is imperative to continue to build on that safety culture after we've
implemented SMS, so where we identified things that aren't working and then
relayed that to our people. It takes resources to keep it all going.”
Over-complication. Throughout multiple conversations, leaders indicated
potential missed opportunities to keep the approach to SMS implementation and
execution simple. Questions one might ask before implementation might include: “Will
our program be an ‘all-hazards’ program, or one that addresses only catastrophic losses?”
or “Will our program address just operational risk, business risk, and/or other types of
risk?”
The carrier in the study implemented a broad program that took some time to fully
deploy. Some of the professionals involved relayed if they had a chance to do it over,
they would recommend that only those issues that are required by regulation should be
covered. After the initial roll-out, the program can be expanded as desired.
Leader A relayed the sentiment to keep the roll-out simple:
“The implementation of SMS resulted in the creation of many jobs and the
development of many processes, and ultimately what I believe has been kind of a
complication of a pretty easy concept. It doesn't have to be magic; it just has to
work right. SMS is simply the formalization of risk management processes, and
then the babysitting of those processes by leadership at all levels. And we have
developed this monster machine for good reason which ultimately gets the job
done.”
Leader B spoke about complexity slowing down processes at the ground level:
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“The implementation was easy to understand as we've scaled this across the
company. It's gotten very complex because our company is very complex. We've
included all parts of the operation--identification of hazards is not limited to
airplane operations and risks. Until we really get a chance for this to sink in and
become part of the operation, it's probably going to be more complex. The people
that are not exposed at the ground level can slow things down—when we bring
other departments into risk assessments, and we get wrapped up and it takes a
while to sort out.”
Leader C reinforced the keep it simple concept:
“Start smaller and start in a simple format and then expand from there. But I
think if you had the opportunity to if you're doing it from scratch, I think building
out those systems (and saying this is what it looks like for us) is best. You can say
these are what the hazards are, and you can really build your assurance
processes to really be closely aligned with what you're looking for--being able to
manage those risks.”
Scope. Closely related to complexity is the concept of scope. A number of the
leaders at the company in the study expressed a desire to remain more focused on the
objective of program compliance than covering the entire operation in the program at
rollout. The desire seemed to emanate from an attitude of “let’s roll out something that
meets the requirements well, and as we get more proficient, we can widen the scope.”
Thus, the carrier might avoid adding layers of complexity in an FAA-approved program
that does not require some of that level of detail.
Leader A stressed the need to keep the focus narrow:
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“We would have been better served to do that very narrow focus—14 CFR Part 5
aircraft accident/incident. Get that program running and then expand it. On the
other hand, I really don't know if you'd ever expand it if we did that, so I think
you're actually better off going all in and recognizing that you're going to be a
little bit behind the power curve when it comes to the non-aircraft accident stuff
(but I think that's going to be a self-imposed challenge, but I think it's worth
taking).”
SRM Consistency. There were many comments from participants surrounding
the need for consistency when performing Safety Risk Management or SRM. Who
should be involved? How should they be trained? How do you keep folks calibrated?
How do we handle issues or instances where one carrier uses SRM, but another does not?
The carrier in the study relayed the general perception amongst its SRM
participants that almost any issue could be construed to theoretically result in a hull loss
as an adverse outcome—but what is the likelihood of that happening? Issues regarding
calibration of SRM team members are probably more common across companies and
industries than not.
Recommendations to Other Carriers
Respondents were asked: “What recommendations do you have for other carriers
that are in the process of implementing SMS?” The participants in the study were very
willing to share their ideas, which included a quote:
“Keep the SMS embedded in the operation or the business, imbed it in your
processes, design it with measures in mind, and use a system safety approach by
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stepping back a bit and constantly assessing the equation: …am I inducing more
risk?.”
Part of the business. Multiple leaders pointed out that an SMS can only work if
it resides in the business, and the entire workforce is fluent in its language and process.
Leader A relayed SMS as a normal business practice:
“So, one of the things that I've kind of figured out is SMS is really pretty simple.
It's just normal business practice. The airline has been effectively managing
operations and finances and all the other things that businesses have to be good
at for a long time. And all SMS has really done is placed that same business
discipline on safety management. If we keep SMS in the business (as we do with
all the other leadership responsibilities) we’ll be successful.”
Leader B mentions that SMS in the business is required to keep it energized:
“It was a lot of work for SMS to kind of seamlessly flow into our normal
processes. The key to keep it vibrant is to insure it sits side-by-side with the
business.”
Imbed in processes. Respondents were quick to point out that SMS is truly
about the process—good design, execution, assessment, and correction. From a company
perspective, if you have sound processes and procedures already—use them. There is no
need to have to create everything from scratch in this process.
Leader A supported the concept of not “throwing away” good work:
“One of the things that helped us a lot was the ability to leverage work we have
already done. It would have been foolish to toss away all of the good work we
had completed to date.”
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Use a system safety approach. Respondents were unanimous in their guidance
around the value of a holistic approach when implementing an SMS. Many cautioned
against losing the “big picture” and the need to consider the system as a system,
interfaces, controls, etc. It can be tempting to rush into a problem-solving phase right
away, but the participants reiterated the importance of the process.
Leader A emphasized understanding the hazards and the controls in your systems:
“And I think in the SMS world, that's exactly what you should be asking yourself - what are your systems? What are the hazards that are in your systems? What
are your controls designed to manage those hazards? And then are those
controls effective? And then when you get to that question, the next question is
how do I know? Do I have the assurance programs designed to measure that?
And so, I think if I was going to do it all over if I knew I had some time, I would
step all the way back out and quantify our systems.”
Leader B discussed the components of a system:
“The interesting part of the systems approach -- if you ask the FAA what a system
is, they may have a different answer than what the airline might say. The term
system is loosely defined. You could argue the FAA defines it as the things that
they do their surveillance on. So, if you looked at this you could say: a system
are those things the FAA is evaluating.”
Safety policy & promotion are key. Respondents universally discussed the
importance of a concise safety policy, efforts to ensure it is well communicated (safety
promotion), and then continuing involvement from the leadership team to ensure others
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are getting the message and fully adopting the SMS. The SMS does not exist in a book
or a vacuum, it exists on the shop floor and in the heart and mind of every employee.
Leader A stressed the need for leadership to push safety policy down into the
organization:
“Well, I think that's the key, isn’t it? Safety policy has got to come from the top as
one of the foundational pillars if you will. Just like ‘safety first’ -- it's got to be an
all the time thing, it can't be a some of the time thing. It's incumbent upon
leadership to impress upon all of the folks that work for them. And then on down
and down and down into the organization that we do mean safety first and
everything else comes secondary, including on-time performance.”
Leader B reiterated safety policy as the core of SMS:
“I think the safety policy is the core of your SMS. Make sure that you write
something that you believe in and that you're willing to go out and stand behind.
Let all of your other communications support that. It’s fundamental. The leader
has got to get everybody on board from the get-go. The leader has to have people
understand definitions. What do we mean by safety? What do we mean by risk?
What do we need mean by mitigations and assurance? And then ensure you have
a well-informed educated workforce.”
Have measures in mind. When designing an SMS (or performing a system
assessment), ultimately one knows there will be a need for an objective measure to
quantify success and allow the oversight of the assurance function. Thus, it is important
to be fluent with the types of measures that are readily available in the operation, as well
as the opportunity to develop new measures as required.
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Leader A stressed the connection between available data and an effective SMS:
“In our operation you know we have lots of data we have access to. We have very
well-thought-out means to reduce and analyze the data. And before we implement
a certain system or control to a system, we think through how we can measure the
effectiveness and so that has worked well. Thus, to the operator at the deck plate
level, the system seems to be pretty effective. Outside of that though, we have the
whole audit system. So internal and external audits do their part to make sure
that our SMS is operating as designed and that our system safety is working, as
well (which is not the same thing as our SMS). But overall, our system safety is
operating at an acceptable level.”
Leader B expressed satisfaction with the use of data under SMS:
“I think the probably the biggest benefit is basically changing from a reactive
method to a proactive method has to do with how we use data. Before we had a
lot of data, and we still have a lot of data that we look at. and we would allow the
data to kind of guide us based on whatever it was for that month. Now
proactively we can say these are the things that we're wanting to look at because
these are what impact our risk in our operation and how we manage that. And so,
we can actually go out and specifically collect that data around those specific
things, rather than just kind of waiting for things to happen.”
Measures of SMS
Participants were asked the following question: “What are some of the measures
used to determine how well your SMS is functioning?” This question was designed as a
follow-on to the last regarding recommendations. Much can be inferred about the

127

maturity of an SMS program if one understands how and what a company measures. The
level of sophistication in this space might be a good indicator of the penetration of a
company’s SMS into the operation.
Lack of negative data is not sufficient. It might be tempting for one to say: “we
have no accidents; therefore, we must be safe.” On the contrary, under an SMS an
operator must actively pursue data (via audit and similar programs) rather than passively
wait for negative news to bubble up. The carrier under examination in the study has
worked very closely with the LOSA Collaborative to develop both a continuous LOSA
(Line Oriented Safety Audit), an industry-leading approach to operational safety.
Leader A stressed the necessity of an active surveillance program:
“Lack of negative data is good, but you know, you have to actively pursue data
about the performance of your systems. In fact, you have to actively seek out both
negative and positive data -- more of a Safety II approach than a Safety I
approach.”
Use dashboards. One of the tools that seems to be growing in popularity
amongst operational groups is safety or SMS dashboards. A safety or SMS dashboard is
data that is aggregated into a central repository and then used to brief responsible parties
(including the Accountable Executive and regulatory agencies) on the workings of a
company’s SMS). Dashboards can be an effective tool in the SMS space. The carrier in
question uses such dashboards at the departmental and senior leadership levels to ensure
there is one set of information being briefed and worked on across the operation.
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Leader A reinforced the tactic of continued use of good pre-SMS products:
“We should still use our dashboards that have been in existence since pre-SMS
that truly show our safety status within the operation. It doesn't show you how all
the processes behind it work but coupled with the new dashboards they are useful.
You need the dashboards with your safety look and then a look behind the curtain
at how the processes really work. Additionally, you need to see where something
is sitting stagnant in the process for years and nobody has even looked there and
touched it.”
Document risk controls. Multiple leaders commented on the need to properly
document systems, hazards, and risk controls early in the process. This discussion also
ties in with the discussion around the scope of the SMS upon implementation. Proper
scaling of the effort at inception will allow timely implementation while still allowing the
program to grow as the operation dictates and the carrier sees fit.
Leader A emphasized the proper identification of hazards at the appropriate level:
“Then there is looking at those big hazards and then trying to evaluate do you
have controls? If you do the groundwork beforehand as you implement your
SMS, it'll be much easier. We're doing a lot of catch-up right now. I'm going back
and doing some of that work, and it's hard because we're in the day-to-day of
running the SMS. And now we're going back in trying to do some of the things
that would have been beneficial to do prior to the full implementation.”
Leader B stressed the documentation of controls:
“Understanding what you control, what the control levers exist, and the
performance output of those levers is key. SMS allows one to really be clear on
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what changes are going to be made and how the organization is going to watch
the metrics to evaluate performance.”
Leverage existing tools. Another important realization after SMS
implementation was the value of leveraging existing tools and processes to facilitate a
timely implementation. At the time of SMS implementation, most organizations will
have safety systems and processes in place that can help serve as the foundation for the
requirements of 14 CFR Part 5.
Leader A reinforced the strategy of using effective tools that are already available:
“Well, my primary recommendation is don't reinvent the wheel. Everyone's got a
unique operation and that's why you can't regulate exactly how one would
implement an SMS. Since everyone's got unique procedures based on their
operation, you can't just do that. But you can find like-minded similar
organizations and start from a position of somewhat formalized processes which
you can then adapt to make your own. I think that not only will that help a new
organization looking to adopt an SMS get started more easily, but it also can
provide valuable feedback to the companies that they work with, where they're
adopting the SMS. It's just continuous improvement.”
Leader B pointed out existing measures are more than likely avaialble:
“At the outset, examine all of your existing measures and programs, because
chances are you are very close to what you need to be compliant under Part 5.
Then, begin the process of implementing your SMS from the top-down, from the
big picture to the small, with an eye on systems and measures throughout the
process.”
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Figure 15 shows a Word cloud of qualitative data highlighting salient codes and themes.
Figure 15
Word cloud of SMS qualitative data.

Factual Operational Performance Data
To complete the triangulation process, real-time and historic safety data at the
carrier was examined. This data includes: the total number of Safety Reporting System
(SRS) reports submitted by year (2016-2021) across the entire enterprise; SRS reports
submitted by workgroup over the same period; the number of Aviation Safety Action
Program (ASAP) reports filed (2015-2021); the ASAP filing rate per 10,000 hours of
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flight time and per 10,000 flights (2016-2021); the number of personnel trained in SMS
by year (2016-2021); the number of new hazards identified (2016-2021); and the number
of new Operational Risk Registry entries (2016-2021). This data provides insight into the
safety culture and reporting culture of the carrier, and it serves as potential confirmatory
evidence regarding the effectiveness of a carrier’s SMS.
Note: at the request of the carrier, the graphics that typically would accompany
this information were not included, to potentially prevent their inappropriate use out of
context in non-academic settings.
Factual Safety Reporting Data
To provide some perspective on the scale of the carrier’s operation, the airline
operated in over 100 cities (domestic and international) throughout the period and
conducted approximately 3,000 to 4,000 flights per day (except during the height of the
Covid pandemic (March 2020 through May 2021), when the flight count decreased
dramatically).
Safety Reporting System (SRS) reporting. The carrier uses its Safety Reporting
System as an all-hazards tool for employees across the enterprise. It is important to note
that safety leaders involved in the study reported aircrew tend to favor ASAP over SRS,
but the two systems together provide valuable insight into the functioning of the SMS.
The carrier began its SMS certification journey in 2015 and was recognized as
being fully compliant by the FAA in 2017. As part of the study, the normalized total of
SRS reports submitted by year (2016-2021) was examined. Since the certification of its
SMS, the carrier has seen an increase in the number of submissions, trending towards the
six-year rolling average. This trend is consistent with a healthy safety reporting culture.
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The normalized SRS report count by workgroup (2016-2021) was also examined.
As mentioned earlier, it was not surprising to see that Flight Ops had fewer reports
relative to other groups, since they tend to use ASAP (with its tie to the FAA’s Aviation
Safety Reporting System). Anonymity is important to crew members. The data suggest
that Ground Ops is by far the most frequent user of the SRS, generally reporting at almost
double the rate of the next nearest group. The six-year rolling trend line was positive.
The data reflected a positive safety and reporting culture at the carrier both before and
after the implementation of SMS.
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reporting. The six-year rolling
average for ASAP reports was normalized to the 2016 total as a baseline. A closer look
at normalized data per 10,000 flight hours and 10,000 flights was also accomplished.
The general downward trend in absolute report numbers is more than likely influenced by
a significant reduction in flights during the Covid pandemic period (March 2020 through
May 2021), and the continued operation of SMS. One might surmise if there was not an
already intact and healthy reporting culture before the implementation of an SMS, one
would see a marked increase in safety reporting post SMS implementation. If a robust
reporting culture existed prior to SMS implementation, it is not unusual to see the number
of reports continue the trend that was indicated pre-SMS implementation.
The ASAP event filing rate, using 2016 data as the baseline, and normalized per
10,000 flight hours were examined as part of the study. As discussed regarding the
absolute ASAP reporting numbers, the same downward trend continued. The increase in
ASAP reports in 2021 is not surprising as the flight count began to return to normal levels
at the carrier.
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As is the case with the overall number of ASAP reports, it will not be surprising
to see the normalized level grow to approach the six-year average as the flight count rises
to its previous level. Once flight activity has fully returned to normal levels, one would
expect the number of reports submitted per 10,000 flight hours to level out (or maybe
even decrease a bit) as the carrier’s SMS matures.
The ASAP event filing rate normalized per 10,000 flights for the years 2016-2021
was also examined. As was the case with the overall number of ASAP reports submitted
and the number of reports submitted normalized by 10,000 flight hours, a steady decrease
occurred during the six-year period (2016-2021). Though the reduction in reports in
2020 is not surprising (given the reduction in flight activity), the rate of that decrease was
notable.
Compared to the number of ASAP reports submitted in 2019, the rate dropped to
almost half (tracking with the number of flights cut). Further research is warranted to
understand the reasons behind such a dramatic drop in reporting during the pandemic.
The carrier recognized this drop in reporting and looked more closely at their other
routine assurance data (Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data, Line Check
results, Continuous LOSA, and the like). The carrier did not observe an increase in
negative trends during the period of lower reporting.
Carrier SMS Training (Factual Data)
A crucial part of an SMS is safety promotion and training. The carrier in this
study has multiple levels of SMS training available, from an introductory course
essentially for all employees, to tailored programs for managers and leaders who will
perform Safety Risk Management (SRM) or accept risk. Generally speaking, the training
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programs are administered via a Learning Management System (or LMS), and they are
refreshed every two years. Figure 16 depicts the number of employees trained annually
from 2016-2021. Note that the first peak in training was after full acceptance of the
carrier’s SMS by their FAA Certificate Management Office in 2017, and the training has
peaks and valleys, with every second year being the more impactful part of the cycle.
Figure 16
SMS Training at the Carrier (2016-2021).

The smaller number of employees trained in 2021 was due to the decrease in
personnel at the carrier due to early retirements and other incentive programs for
employees to leave the company during the pandemic. The general trend line for SMS
training by year is positive, and it is indicative of a healthy SMS at the carrier.
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Carrier SMS New Hazards Identified (Factual Data)
The number of new hazards identified by the carrier during the period 2016-2021
was examined, with 2016 as the baseline. The number of new hazards showed a sharp
decline year over year--this decline is not unexpected. As a carrier begins its journey
down the SMS road, working from large systems to smaller ones, it is not unreasonable
to expect that the number of new hazards would continue to decline. Unless there is a
major change in the operations of a carrier (i.e., it takes on a new mission, a new aircraft,
or dramatically changes another aspect of the enterprise), the number of new hazards
should level off or decline. The findings suggest that a fully mature SMS might have
years with no new hazards identified (if the operation remains status quo).
Carrier SMS New Operational Risk Record (ORR) Entries (Factual Data)
The number of new entries made into the carrier’s Operational Risk Registry
(ORR) by year for the period 2016-2021 (using 2016 data as the baseline) was also
studied. The carrier used the ORR as the repository of all things risk—hazards,
mitigation, SRM results, and risk acceptance. This single record-keeping system includes
data that was contained in older, pre-SMS systems.
As was the case for new hazards identified in the previous example, it would be
expected that the number of new ORR entries would decrease over time (if the operation
was stable). As system analysis is completed, along with SRM and assurance plans, the
carrier should move into oversight mode. The introduction of a new mission (like
ETOPS - Extended Twin Operation Performance Standards), a new aircraft type, or a
new process or procedure would require a new ORR entry. A change in an existing ORR
entry simply requires an update (to include the results of the new SRM).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was designed to build upon past research into the SMS construct,
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation, and safety outcomes
(Adjekum, 2014, 2017; Adjekum et al., 2015, Robertson, 2016) in a collegiate aviation
setting. SMS implementation at Part 121 or commercial carrier in the U.S is still
relatively new, and the value of this research is the glimpse it provides into the
implementation and maintenance of an SMS compliant system from inception through its
relative childhood.
This research evaluates the efficacy of an objective method to assess SMS
performance using a triangulation approach, as well as explores the practicality of using
such a tool in a commercial setting. The concurrent triangulation mixed methods
approach was utilized to address several research questions and develop others. The
primary purpose of the study was the utilization of peer-reviewed and validated tools to
assess a carrier’s implementation and administration of its SMS, while exploring the
potential to use this approach at other carriers.
Extant research in the field of SMS (Teske & Adjekum, 2021, 2022; Adjekum &
Tous, 2020a, 2020b; Insley et al., 2020; Robertson, 2018; Adjekum & Jensen, 2016) has
demonstrated its efficacy in the collegiate and other environments. This research helps
further explore those relationships while embedding an additional question regarding
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what was learned during the implementation of SMS at the carrier. The new information
from the lessons learned should inform similar SMS implementation efforts in the future.
SMS Initiative Implementation
Despite several notable differences, the model proposed by Adjekum (2017)
performed adequately and was useful in the novel setting of a Part 121 carrier. This
research adds to the body of knowledge gained in using a previously validated approach
in a new setting, that of a U.S. commercial carrier.
The use of a previously validated instrument with minor modifications for setting
(as developed from CAPSCAS) saved a great deal of time and effort and allowed more
efficient study at the Part 121 carrier. The similarities in the operations in both settings
far outweigh the differences. Specific differences found around the constructs will be
discussed in detail later in this paper. The quantitative instrument functioned
satisfactorily for this study, but there were some gaps in the functionality of individual
items which were unearthed during the CFA process.
The number of items that did not perform well was surprising, given the work
done on the measures to date. The small sample size may have been a contributing factor
to the low performance of a number of the items. However, after the exclusion of items
as indicated during the CFA process, the overall model fit was vastly improved (Table 4
contains the goodness of fit indices for the final measurement model).
The results and findings of this study confirmed the quantitative and qualitative
tools used herein performed adequately relatively to previous research. It will require
further study to determine if the differences noted in the performance of the instruments
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used were due to setting, population, sample size, or some other factor that could not be
teased out under the current design.
The systematic review of the constructs in this study was similar to the approach
taken by von Thaden and Gibbons (2008) and Chen and Chen (2014). This work must be
accomplished during each implementation to determine the goodness of fit of the model
(due to the relative paucity of similar studies in the literature, and the lack of longitudinal
data from Part 121 carriers to further refine the model). Across multiple settings and
implementations, differences can be found across departments, as well as different
societal and/or safety cultures at a carrier (Thaden et al., 2006). Despite the differences
that can emerge across settings, the consistent reliability and validity of the instruments
used by Adjekum, Chen and Chen and Thaden and Gibbons are noteworthy. The results
of this study reflect their efforts.
SMS Policy Implementation. The importance of a clear, concise safety policy as
the cornerstone of successful SMS implementation cannot be overstated. In both the
quantitative and qualitative portions of the study, respondent global perception of safety
outcomes was linked to a clear safety policy. Additionally, interview data supported the
premise that clear roles, responsibilities, and relationships under the SMS can lead to
positive safety outcomes from the point of view of the respondents at the carrier.
In the quantitative portion of the study, SMS policy implementation had a
significant direct and indirect effect on both safety outcomes whereas Adjekum (2017)
saw a significant relationship with safety compliance, but not safety participation. The
indirect effect points to the importance of safety motivation in the equation. Regarding
safety motivation, Chen & Chen’s (2014) study predicted a positive correlation between
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pilot perceptions of the SMS practices within their airlines and motivation to perform
related safety behaviors. The researchers also assumed safety motivation mediated the
relationship between the selected antecedents and pilots’ safety behaviors, so the direct
and indirect effects of SMS practices on safety outcomes were hypothesized as follows:
pilot perceptions of their airline SMS practices were positively associated with their
safety motivation; pilots’ perceptions of their airline SMS practices were positively
associated with their safety compliance and safety participation; and pilots’ safety
motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of their airlines’ SMS
practices and safety behaviors--both compliance and participation (Chen & Chen, 2014).
Adjekum carried the same view forward into his research, and like Chen & Chen, his
study produces similar results regarding the role of safety motivation. Jian and Probst
(2016) found that transformative leadership style versus passive leadership style in
concert with various levels of safety motivation impacted SC and SP. This suggests that
SMS policy implementation on its own may not be enough to encourage safety
compliance and safety participation behavior.
Safety motivation is a player to encourage both safety outcomes. In the current
research, the direct path was retained between SMSPol, SC, SP, and safety motivation
(though the path between SMSPol and SM was not statistically significant, p = .652).
The path between SMSPro and SM was significant and supported in the work of
Adjekum (2017). Further research is warranted to determine if the performance of the
instrument (the SM scale was reduced to two items after model fit), CR = 0.88 with a
high degree of skewness (-2.990) and kurtosis (9.993), small sample size, or other factors
might have led to the divergence in results versus prior studies.
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The literature strongly suggests that safety policy implementation should originate
from the highest echelons within the organization. There must be clear support from the
operation and its leadership, as well (Teske & Adjekum, 2022; Cavazotte et al., 2021;
Adjekum & Tous, 2020a; FAA, 2019). A core mission and value statement should
encapsulate the safety policy, and the safety policy must be communicated widely across
the organization (Stolzer et al., 2016; Wold & Laumann, 2015; ICAO, 2013).
The data derived from the survey results, interview analysis, and factual data
indicate convergence at the carrier regarding leadership and SMS policy implementation.
SMS Process Engagement. Prior research has indicated that the acceptance of
the key tenets of SMS policy by front-line personnel (i.e. SMS process engagement) is
not always forthcoming but is required for effective SMS implementation (Adjekum,
2017; Robertson, 2016; Wold & Laumann, 2015). The respondents in this study
indicated the importance of seeing the “buy-in” by leadership as a necessary condition for
front-line acceptance.
In the quantitative portion of the study, respondent perception of SMS process
engagement was very weakly related to safety compliance (but not safety participation-both results were the opposite of Adjekum’s (2017) work). Additionally, the direct
relationship between SMSPro and SM in this study was not significant (p = .361). In the
final measurement model, the direct path between SMSPro and SP was not retained.
The SMSPro scale assesses how stakeholders perceive the policies defining
conditions that might lead to potential punitive actions in the safety arena, safety
reporting, reportable events, and the like. The positive relationship between SMSPro and
SC suggests that a clear delineation of policy and expectations facilitates safety
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compliance behavior. The lack of a relationship between SMSPro and SM and SP might
be due to the carrier’s mature safety culture (it has had a solid 50-year safety history) and
its demonstrated safety reporting culture, in which there are professional individual goals
for continuous improvement embraced by the line and management, alike. There is no
formal requirement to participate in more safety promotion events, as these are all
specified by contract and the carrier’s advanced qualification program (aircrew training
program).
In multiple discussions, respondents at the commercial carrier re-iterated the
value of seeing their leaders promoting, then utilizing the SMS framework in the
operation. The relationship between the perceived power distance between employees
and leadership can vary across the culture in which a carrier operates, and it can directly
impact employee satisfaction with leadership (Wei et al., 2017). Power distance can
explain a moderating role both at the cultural and individual level, and when coupled
with employee expectations, could be very influential in the perceived efficacy of
leadership (Wei et al., 2016). The carrier under examination is notable for the low power
distance relationship between senior leadership and front-line employees.
Teske and Adjekum (2022) found a positive correlation with a strong effect
between the four key attributes of SMS (safety policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion) and mindful organizing. Both are positively correlated
with positive safety outcomes. Though SMSPol and SMSPro items were both found in
the survey used for Teske and Adjekum’s (2022) study, it is not as important to cull out
the results for each subset, but rather to recognize the close relationship between SMS
and mindful organizing.
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Adjekum and Tous (2020b) researched four management factors and resilient
safety culture in high-reliability organizations: principles, policy, procedures, and
practice. Policy had the highest predictive power and practices the weakest. The
connection between leadership and the group of folks who set the principles and develop
the policy was clear.
Wang (2018) examined the Aviation Divisions of the Ministry of National
Defense (ADMND), Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC) to determine if their “SMS-like”
system produced a safety culture appropriate to an SMS. Wang’s (2018) work
highlighted the importance of leadership engagement and how the tenets of SMSPro can
impact the effectiveness of an SMS. Their inclusion of Just Culture in the discussion also
was interesting, in that a number of the respondents in the study at hand said the U.S.
implementation of SMS fell short by not emphasizing and/or facilitating the
implementation of Just Culture at U.S. carriers at the same time as SMS. The carrier
examined in this study and its multiple workgroups were continuing the discussions
around Just Culture at the time of this study.
Additionally, the role of safety leadership has been shown to impact safety
behaviors by other researchers (Neal et al., 2000; Neal et al., 2006; and Friewald, 2013),
as well.
Though there were some differences found between this study and others, from a
triangulation approach the carrier in the study does not appear to have gaps in its
approach to SMSPro and its operation.
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Triangulated Results of SMS Initiative
The results of this study indicate the carrier effectively utilized all available
financial, technical/technological, and human resources needed to effectively implement
and manage their nascent SMS. Themes that emerged included: the importance of the
leader setting the tone; having a clear line of responsibility between risk and the
accountable executive; the presence of a strong accountable executive; and the need for
executives to guide the organization through SMS implementation.
Additionally, other recommendations for companies in the process of
implementing an SMS included: a need for solid documentation; avoidance of overcomplication; keeping SMS as part of the business; safety policy and promotion are key;
having proactive processes and measures as part of the plan and have measures in mind.
The examination of factual data at the carrier corroborates the findings from the
survey and the semi-structured interviews. Specifically, the SMS implementation at the
carrier has provided both front-line employees and leadership with the necessary
resources, tools, and measures to effectively adopt and execute an SMS. The carrier in
this study had an effective safety program and a mature safety culture before the
implementation of SMS.
The data from implementation to the current day is somewhat confounded by the
occurrence of the Covid-19 pandemic (March 2020 through May 2021), which greatly
impacted flight counts. However, a steadily increasing number of safety reports (as the
number of operations grew), along with robust numbers of personnel trained in SMS, and
continuous and appropriate use of the company’s risk tracking systems all indicate
congruence with the quantitative and qualitative measures in the study.
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Implications for Theory
This study is an attempt to measure the dimensionality of the SMS initiative in a
U.S. commercial air carrier operation. This study is an extension of work begun by
Adjekum (2017) and others and may serve as an empirical framework for use at other
commercial carriers (both pre and post SMS implementation) to positively influence the
roll-out and sustained execution of an SMS. The results of this study re-affirm extant
literature which states SMS policy should be clear, set goals and objectives, must be
accessible to all employees, and must be part of the enterprise strategic plan (Stolzer et
al., 2011).
Relationships between SMS Initiative and Other Study Variables
A central purpose of this research was the examination of the interplay between
SMS initiative, self-efficacy, transformational safety leadership, safety motivation safety
participation, safety compliance, and safety-related events. The results from the
structural equation model and path analysis indicate the respondent perceptions about the
SMS policy implementation generally had a significant (but weak) effect on their safety
compliance and safety participation (except in the case of SMSPro and SP). The results
reinforce the notion that an investment in the SMS initiative with the employee group and
management team may enhance their perceptions regarding the operation and safety
outcomes.
This result aligns with other research which confirms a positive relationship
between SMS and safety culture in aviation organizations (Teske & Adjekum, 2021,
2022; Adjekum & Tous, 2020a, 2020b; Insley et al., 2020; Smith et al., 2020; Robertson,
2018; Adjekum & Jensen, 2016; Freiwald, 2013; Chen et al., 2014).
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SMS Policy Implementation, Safety Motivation, Safety Compliance, and Safety
Participation
This study validates a positive (but weak) path between SMSPol, SP, and SC.
Additionally, a significant moderate pathway was found between safety motivation and
safety compliance (β = .376, p < .001) and safety participation (β = .341, p < .001). In
alignment with Adjekum’s (2017) findings, the results corroborate Neal and Griffin’s
(2006) suggestion that SMS implementation could be a viable predictor of SC and SP.
The results indicated that when participants understand the SMS policy and how the
program is being implemented, they may be more motivated to get involved in safetyrelated activities. This finding reinforces the notion that a well-defined SMS policy is
important to drive the entire SMS initiative (Stolzer, et al., 2008; ICAO, 2013).
Policy implication. Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory can help explain the
connection between employee motivation and safety outcomes. Under Herzberg’s
model, motivation can be split between hygiene factors and motivation factors.
Motivation factors achievement, recognition, and responsibility (Greenberg, 2013). A
strong safety promotion campaign that empowers front-line workers to get involved,
holds both leaders and employees responsible and recognizes those who are leading the
SMS transition can have a positive impact on the SMS outcome. To energize the
achievement and/or recognition element of Herzberg’s model, management should ensure
the Chief Pilots (or other leaders) routinely praise behaviors that led to a satisfactory
safety outcome, including any incentives that the company might allow (reward points,
etc.) that personnel can use for various items or programs of their choice.
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SMS Process Engagement, Safety Motivation, Safety Compliance, and Safety
Participation
This study validates a positive (but weak) path between SMSPro and SC.
Additionally, a significant moderate pathway was found between safety motivation and
safety compliance (β = .376, p < .001) and safety participation (β = .341, p < .001). Other
researchers (Adjekum, 2017) found a significant path from SMSPro to SP. Vroom’s
Expectancy Theory can help explain the connection between SMSPro and SC. Given
that personnel change their level of effort based upon the value of the reward they might
receive and their perception of the link between effort and outcome (Vroom, 1964;
Bandura, 1986). It is critical that leaders remain engaged and help employees clearly
understand that their actions have consequences under the SMS, and if the link between
effort and outcome can be clearly established, more positive safety outcomes will result.
Policy implication. Under Vroom’s model, company officials should be clear in
the design, implementation, and promotion of an SMS to address Vroom’s expectancy,
instrumentality, and valence concepts with the employee group (Vroom, 1964).
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reward offered has to be meaningful to the pilot and pilots have to clearly see the
connection between action and reward.
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Motivation, Safety Compliance, and
Safety Participation
The results of the final measurement model indicated significant direct and
indirect effects of transformational safety leadership on safety participation (β = .232, p <
.001). The direct effect between TSL and SP was .232, the indirect effect was .051 for a
total effect of .283. There was no statistically significant path or effect between TSL and
safety compliance (similar to Adjekum’s (2017) study).
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Additionally, there was also a significant moderate direct effect on safety
motivation by transformational safety leadership (β = .341, p < .05). And as noted
earlier, SM had a significant direct effect on both SP and SC. Thus, there was a positive
effect of transformational safety leadership due to the mediation effect of safety
motivation.
The connection between transformational safety leadership and safety
participation is not surprising based on extant research. Bass and Avolio (1994) posit
that transformational leadership motivates followers to improve performance by
converting them, rather than simply gaining compliance. In the case of the carrier in
question, the very active engagement by the leadership team (as discussed in the factual
data examination) began the “conversion” process by motivating front-line employees to
fully embrace the SMS.
The connection between leadership and safety-related outcomes has been well
documented. Zohar (2002) posits that the role of leadership should be emphasized as a
mechanism to improve safety. The significant results of the quantitative survey and the
data gathered from the qualitative survey indicate the carrier under examination had an
appropriate level of involvement from its leadership throughout the SMS implementation
process. Additionally, the visible leadership involvement at the carrier was in keeping
with Zohar’s recommendations.
Kelloway, et al. (2006) found safety-specific transformational leadership had a
positive effect on organizational safety, namely employee perception of safety
consciousness and safety-related events. The factual data examined in the study captured
the large amount of SMS training that took place at the carrier during the implementation
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and sustainment of their SMS. The involvement of leadership in that training, as well as
the very visible ongoing relationship of leadership with line-employees means there is
little room for doubt regarding the importance leadership places on the carrier’s SMS.
Bass and Riggio (2006) posit there are four key elements of TSL. Adjekum
(2016) noted two were crucial to ensuring the connection between TSL and SP was
realized: individualized consideration and inspirational motivation. The carrier in
question is well known both in the industry and amongst its employees for scoring high
marks in both elements. Given the strong connection between these elements and safety
behaviors, carriers might reap not only safety-related benefits but many other benefits
from exercising the principles of transformational safety leadership.
Policy implication. Research has suggested a wide range of benefits resulting
from the successful implementation of transformational safety leadership. Faranhak et al.
(2020) found team member attitude toward change and transformational leadership are
important determinants of implementation success. Hussain et al. (2021) reported a high
degree of transformational leadership can increase job satisfaction and organizational
commitment. Other researchers, such as Normo et al. (2022), Cavazotte et al. (2021),
Smith et al. (2020), Shen et al. (2017), Jian and Probst (2016), Clarke & Ward, 2006, and
Barling et al., 2002) reported direct positive effects of transformational leadership on
individual and/or organizational safety outcomes.
Operators should be reminded that communicating openly, reaching out
individually to employees where they want to be met, and giving them a cause to rally
around will lead to satisfactory safety results. The carrier under examination uses its inperson training programs across departments to ensure leadership has direct engagement
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with line employees in a “safe space.” When correctly deployed, leadership is using
idealized influence, inspirational motivation, and intellectual stimulation by facilitating a
conversation about current issues on the line, and potential improvements. Leaders at all
carriers are encouraged to consider this approach.
Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation, Safety Compliance, and Safety Participation
The final measurement model found self-efficacy and safety compliance were
significantly but weakly related, (β = .157, p < .05). The direct effect between SE and SC
was .157, the indirect effect was .092 for a total effect of .249. The relationship between
SE and SP was non-significant. And finally, there was a strong direct effect between SE
and SM (β = .244, p < .05). As mentioned earlier in the paper, there was also a strong
direct effect between SM and SC and SP.
The results of this study support earlier research that indicated self-efficacy is a
reliable predictor of safety-related work behavior for pilots (see Parasuraman et al., 1993;
Prinzel, 2002). Thus, the weak to moderate total effect between SE and SC, and the
stronger effect on SC and SP when moderated by SM is well-founded in theoretical
research (Ślazyk-Sobol et al., 2021; Cayir and Ulupinar, 2021; and Ji et al., 2017).
Policy implication. As SMS continues to be rolled out, leadership should ensure
that the program continues to recognize the connection between self-efficacy and safety
behaviors. The carrier under examination utilized its training program (an Advanced
Qualification Program or AQP, designed to incorporate near-real-time information from
the operational environment into the training program in an SMS-like manner) to give
pilots a chance to hone their skills at specified intervals. The AQP incorporates a
completion standard so all crews will leave training with the requisite level of skill
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required to operate safely in the specific environment in which the carrier operates. Thus,
training has morphed from purely an evaluation to a training space with a line-oriented
evaluation at its conclusion. Carriers are encouraged to utilize AQP (or other tactical
programs designed to build self-efficacy) to the maximum extent possible.
Safety Compliance, Safety Participation, and Safety-Related Events
The relationship between safety compliance was related to safety participation
with a strong, direct effect (β = .590, p < .001). The direct effect between SC and SP was
.591, the indirect effect was .003 for a total effect of .594. This finding was aligned with
Adjekum’s (2017) prior research. The findings were also in line with Zohar’s (2002)
study that suggested a causal relationship between personnel safety performance
indicators, such as compliance with safety regulations and safety-related events.
The path between SRE and SC was not significant (an opposite result of
Adjekum’s (2017) study). Additionally, the relationship between SP and SRE was
moderate and significant, (β = .310, p < .001), again opposite of Adjekum’s (2017) work.
Thus, the hypothesis that safety-related events mediated the relationship between SC and
SP was not supported.
Factual data was not available for direct evaluation of safety-related events. The
examination of reporting data, and a thorough comb through of the qualitative interview
data did not provide any indication of a level of safety-related events that was of concern
to the safety leaders who participated in the study. Additionally, respondents generally
reported satisfaction regarding the overall safety level of the organization.
The low incident rate in the U.S. Part 121 environment can lead to a sense of
complacency in company leadership. The benefit of an SMS is the ongoing assurance
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programs and the risk analysis and mitigation that goes into change management.
Carriers should be cautioned to not allow the seemingly distal relationship between SP
and SC to lull them into a sense that continuous improvement efforts on the flight deck
and/or in the operation can be relaxed.
Demographic Effects
As part of the implementation of SMS within an organization, one should
consider any unique challenges or opportunities due to the demographics of the employee
and management group (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008; Adjekum, 2014a). Factors such
as nationality, age, gender, and/or others might impact the reception of SMS training and
process execution. An ANOVA was conducted to examine differences in SC and SRE
based on years at the company, age, and role.
Years at the company. Employee years at the company, SC and SRE were
examined to detect any differences across between years at the company brackets. There
was a statistically significant difference between the average SC score of personnel who
have been at the company for greater than 25 years (M = 4.72, SD = .425) and those who
have been at the company for greater than 20 years but less than 25 years (M = 4.31, SD
= .653).
The slightly higher mean SC score for the greater than 25 to thirty-year group
stands out slightly, possibly indicating a need for targeted training on SC for personnel in
other year groups. The carrier reported a high level of selectivity during pilot hiring and it
prides itself on a high level of standardization (based upon its AQP standards). Thus,
most pilots arrive at the carrier with both a high level of experience and strong success
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history. Even for these highly qualified aviators, years of repetitious flying could lead to
complacency and normalization of deviance.
The carrier in the study had incorporated an entire model on “getting back to
basics” to address the normalization of deviance in its AQP at the time of this writing. A
closer examination of years at the company and SRE revealed no significant differences.
Age. An examination of SC versus age bracket and SRE versus age bracket both
failed to reveal significant differences. The current study failed to reveal significant
differences in respondent perception of SC across the various workgroups. The items
included in the safety-related events scale are reported at least annually to the pilots in a
steady-state environment, and the carrier reports completing targeted safety
communications as required. The carrier reports consistency in this regard, so it is not
surprising that there are no significant differences between groups regarding SRE.
Additionally, the reporting level at the carrier is mature, so the general acceptance across
all groups is not surprising.
Role. Significant results were detected between the respondent perception of
safety-related events of First Officers (M = 2.67, SD = .363) and Check Airmen (M =
2.91, SD = .384). Since the factual SRE data was not obtained as part of the study,
validating the perceptions of both groups is impossible. Check Airman (and Instructors)
generally relayed a perception of the slightly high occurrence of safety-related events
than a line pilot (First Officer or Captain).
This difference might be due to expectancy (as Check Airmen and Instructors deal
more often with aggregate safety reports and safety updates than do line pilots) or events
they experience while giving line training. The training role of the Check Airmen and
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Instructors allows them to have a deeper insight into what is going on (especially in the
realm of recent investigation outcomes). Thus, it is not surprising that Check Airmen and
Instructors report a higher occurrence rate than do First Officers.
Gender. A t-test revealed a statistically significant difference in male and female
respondents regarding safety compliance. Female perception of SC (M = 4.80, SD =
.243) was higher than that of males (M = 4.44, SD = .609), with a medium-sized effect
(Cohen’s d = .626). The study also revealed a significant difference between the
perception of male and female respondents and safety-related events.
Female perception of SRE (M = 2.98, SD = .171) was higher than that of males
(M = 2.80, SD = .434), with a weak to moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .426). These
results are similar to the results of Kearns and Aitken-Shirmer (2017) regarding gender
differences and the perceived effectiveness of SMS and SMS training.
Additionally, Kao et al. (2021) found significant relationships between gender and
safety compliance (females higher), safety participation (females higher), and injury rates
(females lower) based on gender while studying mindfulness, safety performance, and
safety culture in the oil industry. Further research is required to determine if the results
with gender, age group, and/or years at the company hold with other samples.
First exposure to SMS. A t-test revealed no significant differences in SC and SP
between those who had their first exposure to SMS at the carrier, and those who had it
elsewhere. However, a significant difference was detected between those who had their
first exposure to SMS at the carrier at their perception of SRE (M = 2.86, SD = .428), and
those who had their first exposure to SMS elsewhere (M = 2.66, SD = .359). Cohen’s d =
.486, a weak to moderate effect. The carrier under investigation had just begun a hiring
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cycle as this study was commencing, but no new hire pilots were not included in the
study.
The data might indicate that a comprehensive SMS training program (to include
risk identification, reporting, and SRM) for all personnel allows company personnel to
accurately identify risk or the behaviors associated with SRE, but it may not totally
overcome training received elsewhere. The carrier in this study provides such training.
Further research is needed.
Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to use a convergent mixed methods data
triangulation approach to evaluate the relationships between SMS initiative (SMS policy
implementation and SMS process engagement), transformational safety leadership, selfefficacy, and safety performance parameters (safety compliance and safety participation)
at a U.S Part 121 carrier.
A mediation analysis was also conducted using safety motivation as a mediator.
Variations in the perceptions of research participants on study variables were collected
and statistically significant differences were noted. The study was also designed to
establish proactive operational safety benchmarks for continuous monitoring and
improvements in SMS implementation at a U.S. commercial air carrier.
The respondents (n = 256) for the quantitative part of the study were from a U.S.
Part 121 commercial carrier with an SMS approved by an FAA Certificate Management
Office. The survey respondents who completed the 43-item survey included line pilots,
check-airmen, instructors, and “other” flight operations subject matter experts at the
carrier. The quantitative survey contained items to measure respondent perceptions of
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study variables. Concurrently, semi-structured interviews were conducted with twelve
middle managers and senior safety leadership personnel at the carrier to gather their
opinions on the SMS initiative. Finally, factual data at the carrier over six years was
examined to complete the concurrent-triangulation approach.
The outcome of this research provided both a quantitative measurement model for
an objective evaluation of SMS effectiveness and the inter-relationships with other study
variables at a Part 121 carrier. The qualitative portions of the research provided themes
to provide a contextual understanding of the data gathered using the quantitative models.
Finally, factual data from the company being examined was used to corroborate the
findings of the other two phases of the work. The examination of the data, along with
corporate artifacts and objective safety outcomes allowed the researcher to make holistic
inferences regarding the efficacy of SMS implementation.
A final measurement model was proposed using Structural Equation Modeling –
Path Analysis (SEM-PA) techniques. Five iterations were used to derive the best fit for a
final measurement model using both modification indices and theoretical considerations.
Multiple iterations were used to derive the best fit for the model. The best fit model was
then used for hypothesis testing and validation of conclusions.
The results indicated SMS policy implementation had a significant direct and
indirect effect on both safety outcomes (SC and SP). Safety motivation was essential in
encouraging both safety outcomes. The direct path was retained between SMSPol, SC,
SP, and safety motivation. The path between SMSPol and SM was significant. SMSPro
had a very weak relationship with SC, but not SP.
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This study validates a positive (but weak) path between SMSPol, SP, and SC.
Additionally, a significant moderate relationship was found between safety motivation
and safety compliance. This study validated a positive (but weak) path between SMSPro
and SC. Additionally, a significant moderate pathway was found between safety
motivation and safety compliance, and safety participation. The results of the final
measurement model indicated significant direct and indirect effects of transformational
safety leadership on safety participation.
Additionally, there was also a significant moderate direct effect on safety
motivation by transformational safety leadership. And finally, the final measurement
model found self-efficacy and safety compliance were significantly but weakly related.
A significant direct and indirect effect was indicated between SE and SC. Overall
findings from the triangulation of various data sources depicted a positive perception by
respondents of the SMS initiative (SMSPro and SMSPol) at the carrier that was
corroborated by factual safety performance data and interviews with middle managers
and senior safety leaders.
An ANOVA indicated a statistically significant difference between the average
SC score of personnel who have been at the company for greater than 25 years and those
who have been at the company for greater than 20 years but less than 25 years. The
difference may indicate a need to provide targeted safety training at certain points in a
pilot’s career. The carrier under examination had begun such training for all pilots
regarding the normalization of deviance at the time of this study.
Significant results were also obtained between the respondent perception of
safety-related events of Frist Officers and Check Airmen (with First Officers scoring
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lower). It was suggested that this difference might be due to expectancy (as Check
Airmen and Instructors deal more often with aggregate safety reports and safety updates
than do line pilots). Thus, the Check Airmen and Instructors may have the latest
information in their work setting before line pilots.
A t-test of means revealed a statistically significant difference in male and female
respondents regarding safety compliance, with female respondents scoring higher than
male respondents. The study also revealed a significant difference between the
perception of male and female respondents on safety-related events. Female perception
regarding the rate of SRE was higher than that of males.
Previous research had detected differences between men and women regarding
perceptions of SMS effectiveness (Kearns & Aitkens-Shirmer, 2017) and mindfulness,
safety participation, safety compliance, and injury in oil production (Kao et al., 2019).
Finally, a significant difference was detected between those who had their first exposure
to SMS at the carrier and their perception of SRE, with first exposure at the carrier
employees reporting a perception of a higher rate of SRE than those who were exposed
first to SMS elsewhere.
A thorough SMS training program for all personnel at the carrier in the study may
have allowed rapid and thorough assimilation of the standard for SRE, it may not have
overcome previous training at another company. Further research is required to
determine if the results are due to gender, age group, years at the company, and/or first
exposure to SMS hold with other samples and in other settings.
Overall, this study helped provide depth to the research regarding SMS
implementation and steady-state execution at a commercial U.S. air carrier. This study
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was designed to help industry leaders, regulators, and policymakers promulgate
objective, data-driven policies that are also cost-effective in approach. That will ensure
continuous improvement in safety for the flying public. Additionally, this study was also
intended to help fill a gap in research as SMS becomes the benchmark for safety and
reliability for high-reliability organizations globally.
Limitations
There are limitations in this study due to its design, its execution, technical
aspects, and the researcher. This study gathered individuals’ attitudes and perceptions, so
there is some likelihood of a degree of response bias or social desirability bias in the
results. It is assumed that the responses reflect the true attitudes of the participants at the
time and place of administration.
Given the various power relationships of the investigator and the various
respondents, bias may have occurred. Additionally, the researcher is knowledgeable in
the field and also works in operations and is a participant in graduate school—all of these
factors must be considered when examining the conclusions of the study and the
underlying factors the researcher may unintentionally pass into the work.
The iterative nature of the model used in this study has the potential to leave out
meaningful connections in an attempt to achieve the best fit between the measurement
model, the structural model, and reality. The use of factor analysis (Confirmatory) and
SEM-PA modification indices can influence the final outcome. Other technical issues
might include a relatively small sample size, items as part of a construct that did not
perform adequately (leading to a small number of items per construct). Further item
analysis is warranted.
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Finally, the concurrent approach was a snapshot at a U.S carrier emerging from
the pandemic—the results might have been very different if done in a different time and
place. Additionally, a very informative study across time (to gather longitudinal data)
would add value to this study.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study helps set the benchmark for SMS implementation and execution at a
U.S. 14 CFR Part 121 carrier. Additional research at other commercial carriers would
add value to this work. More work is needed to determine if the safety performance
metrics established in this study can be effectively used in a concurrent triangulation
study to evaluate the current state of a carrier’s SMS. Replication of this study using a
longitudinal approach in both the commercial and collegiate environments will strengthen
inferences and generalizability of findings in the populations of study. A further
examination of the impact of gender, role, years at the company, and first exposure to
SMS on key study variables is also warranted. Further work is also needed to determine
if there are true differences in results between similar studies in a collegiate environment
and a commercial environment.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Semi-Structured Interview
The following questions will be posed to selected senior management personnel
during the semi-structured interview in order to explore the leadership perspective on the
health of the carrier’s SMS and the carrier’s current safety performance (Adjekum &
Jensen, 2016):
1. Review consent terms – do you voluntarily consent to the terms of the study?
2. What role does leadership play in the safety policy implementation of the SMS
program?
3. What are some of the benefits of the implementation of SMS at the carrier?
4. What are some of the challenges in the execution of SMS at the carrier?
5. What recommendations do you have for other carriers that are in the process of
implementing SMS?
6. What are some of the measures used to determine how well your SMS is
functioning?
Note: survey administrators should listen for tangents that might provide insight
beyond the constructs discussed herein. There may be inter-relationships between key
construct variables that emerge as part of the interviews.
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Appendix B
Quantitative Survey Instrument

SMS Questionnaire
Demographics
Q2. What is your current role at the Airline?
Check Airman
Captain
First Officer
Instructor
None of the above
Q3. How many years have you worked at the Airline?
0 – 5 years
5+ - 10 years
10+ - 15 years
15+ - 20 years
20+ - 25 years
25+ - 30 years
30+ years
Q4. What is your age?
<= 25 years
25+ - 30 years
30+ - 35 years
35+ - 40 years
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40+ - 45 years
45+ - 50 years
50+ - 55 years
55+ - 60 years
60+ years
Q5. Gender:
Female
Male
Prefer to not report
Q6. Your first exposure to Safety Management System (SMS) was at this airline?
True
False
SMS Policy Implementation (SMSPol)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q7. (SMSPol) The safety policy is signed and approved by the Accountable Executive (top
level management) who demonstrates a commitment to safety through active and visible
participation in the Safety Management System (SMS).
Q8. (SMSPol) Safety professionals with the appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience
conduct SMS training.
Q9. (SMSPol) The results of safety performance review are used by the Accountable
Executive (top level leadership) as input to the safety improvement processes.

Q10. (SMSPol) There is a process that provides for the capture of internal information
including incidents, accidents, and other data relevant to SMS.
Q11. (SMSPol) Management allocates adequate resources for achieving the safety
objectives and goals of the organization.
Q12. (SMSPol) There is a policy in place that provides immunity from disciplinary action
for all personnel that report safety deficiencies, hazards, or occurrences (i.e., ASAP, SRS,
etc.).
SMS Process Engagement (SMSPro)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q13. (SMSPro) Conditions under which punitive disciplinary action would be considered
(e.g., illegal activity, negligence, or willful misconduct) are not clearly defined.
Q14. (SMSPro) Personnel are not informed on the primary contacts for aviation-related
safety matters.
Q15. (SMSPro) The scope of the safety-related hazards that must be reported are not
explained to personnel.
Q16. (SMSPro) Safety concerns reported through the safety reporting system are corrected
in a timely manner.
Q17. (SMSPro) Knowing how and where to report safety concerns is easy.
Q18. (SMSPro) Safety reporting does not provide confidentiality for safety reports filed.
Self-efficacy (SE)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
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Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q19. (SE) I have the tools required to solve difficult problems.
Q20. (SE) It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish the plan.
Q21. (SE) I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
Q22. (SE) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping
abilities.
Safety Motivation (SM)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q23. (SM) It’s worthwhile to maintain or improve personal safety.
Q24. (SM) It’s important to maintain safety at all times.
Q25. (SM) It’s important to reduce the risk of safety events in flight operations.
Safety Compliance (SC)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
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Q26. (SC) I pay full attention to the pre-flight briefing when operating.
Q27. (SC) I follow correct safety procedures when operating.
Q28. (SC) I strive to ensure the highest level of safety when operating.
Safety Participation (SP)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q29. (SP) I promote the safety program within the organization.
Q30. (SP) I put in extra effort to improve flight safety.
Q31. (SP) I am an active proponent of flight safety with my fellow Pilots.
Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL)
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Strongly disagree (1)
Somewhat disagree (2)
Neither agree nor disagree (3)
Somewhat agree (4)
Strongly agree (5)
Q32. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership go beyond self-interest for the good of the
program.
Q33. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership do not listen to my concerns.
Q34. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership can be trusted to address obstacles in the
operation.
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Q35. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership clearly define the steps needed to execute a
safe operation.
Q36. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership considers the ethical consequences of
decisions.
Q37. (TSL) Chief Pilots/Flight Ops Leadership are disrespectful when handling errors by
airmen.
Safety Related Events (SRE)
Please state to the best of your knowledge the frequency of events that have occurred in the
operation in the previous year involving company pilots.
The questions in this section use the following scale:
Extremely rare (1)
Rare (2)
Occasional (3)
Frequent (4)
Very Frequent (5)
Q38. (SRE) Across the operation on a monthly basis, how often do company flights deviate
from ATC instructions under normal flight conditions?
Q39. (SRE) Across the operation on a monthly basis, how often do company flights
encounter close proximity to another aircraft requiring evasive action?
Q40. (SRE) Across the operation on a monthly basis, how often does an aircraft suffer a
collision with fixed ground object during taxi?
Q41. (SRE) Across the operation on a monthly basis, how often are flight parameters
exceeded requiring FDAP (flight data monitoring) trigger and event review?
Qualitative Questions
Q42. What are your opinions on the safety performance of the operation since the
implementation of the SMS initiative?
Q43. How can the organization improve the SMS initiative?
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Appendix D
IRB Approval
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Appendix E
The Fully Mediated Structural Model with Covariance Between Error Terms

Appendix F
Model II: Covariance Between e6/e7 Removed
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